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THE REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORPORATION ACT AND CORPORATE 
LAW REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI: 
PART ONE 
Wendell H. Holmes* 
In 1987, the Mississippi Business Corporation Act1 (herein­
after MBCA) will mark the first quarter-century of its exis­
tence.1 The age of twenty-five years might seem mere infancy for 
a major business statute, particularly one that comprehensively 
supplanted the disconnected corporate statutes that p receded it. 
Moreover, most corporate practitioners in this state would prob­
ably agree that in commonplace transactions the MBCA 
presents a workable set of rules with which to deal. Thus, one 
might initially question the necessity (not to say the wisdom) of 
the notion of corporate law reform which the title of this article 
advances. 
In a sense, however, the MBCA may be considered to be at 
least thirty-six years old as of the writing of this article. The 
MBCA was b ased upon the Model Business Corporation Act, 
which in 1950 assumed the basic form with which the Missis­
sippi Legislature worked. s In turn, the Model Act itself was 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi. B.A. 1974, Millsaps College; 
J .D. 1977, Tulane University. The author acknowledges with gratitude the support of the 
Lamar Order of the Law Alumni Chapter of the University of Mississippi, which pro­
vided a Summer Research Fellowship which made possible the research for this article. 
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. 
1 Miss. Coos ANN. §§ 79-3-3 to -293 (Supp. 1985). 
1 For a discussion of the history of the adoption of the MBCA see Hodge & Perry, 
The Model Business Corporation Act: Does the Mississippi Version Lime the Bushes?, 
46 Miss. L.J. 371 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hodge & Perry] 
• Eisenberg, The Model Business Corporation Act and the Model Business 
Corporaction Act Annotated, 29 Bus. LAW. 1407, 1407-08 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
Eisenberg, Model Act]. Professor Melvin Eisenberg has noted that the first preliminary 
draft of the Model Act appeared in 1943; in 1946, the Corporation Law Committee of the 
American Bar Association promulgated the "Model for State Business Corporation 
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largely adapted from the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 
1933.' In some ways, then, the MBCA may have been dated 
from its very inception. 
Since its adoption, however, developments in corporate 
thinking have rendered the MBCA outmoded in many signifi­
cant respects. In the areas of formation, 11 corporate management 
and governance,8 capitalization and distribution policy, organic 
changes, and problems of the close corporation,7 dramatic 
changes in both statutory and case law have occurred. The sig­
nificance of those developments alone would suggest the need 
for a re-exam ination of the MBCA. 
The most significant signpost to a re-evaluation of our stat­
ute is, however, the promulgation o f  the Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act (hereinafter RMA) in 1984. The RMA repre­
sents the culmination of some five years of work by the Commit­
tee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking 
and Business Law of the American Bar Association. It is the first 
complete revision of the Model Act for more than thirty years.9 
Acts"; other revisions followed in 1950, 1953, 1959, and 1969. Id. It is noteworthy that by 
1969, seven years after the adoption of the MBCA, a new edition of the Model Act had 
been published which substantially differed from the MBCA in several important re­
spects. See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. (2d ed. 1971). Furthermore, sub­
stantive revisions continued throughout the next decade, with major changes occurring 
in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, and 1980. 1 MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. xxvi-xxix (3d ed. 
1985). This process of revision, coupled with the need for either a new edition or recodifi­
cation, led ultimately to the adoption of the 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation 
Act. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. For further background of the history of 
the Model Act see Campbell, The Model Business Corporation Act, 1 1  Bus. LAW. 98 
(1956); Garrett, History, Purpose and Summary o f  the Model Business Corporation Act, 
6 Bus. LAW. 1 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Garrett). 
• 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 1 (2d ed. 1971). It should be noted that in 
1983, Illinois adopted a completely revised business corporation act. Illinois Business 
Corporation Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1.01-17.05 (Supp. 1983), repealing ILL. 
R�v. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 1 57.1-167 (1933). For analyses of the new Illinois legislation see Van 
Vhet, Jr., The New Illinois Business Corporation Act Needs More Work, 61 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1 (1985); Symposium on the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1985 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 635. 
1 See infra notes 17 ·66 and accompanying text. • See infra notes 67-318 and accompanying text. 
' These latter topics will be the subject of Part Two of this article. • REVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CORP. AcT ANN. xxiv-xxvi (3d ed. 1985). Several reasons 
�derlie the ado�tion of the RMA rather than another revision to the 1969 Model Act. First, the Committee on Corporate Laws was considering updating the Model Business 
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Since the source of Mississippi's general corporate law has now 
been completely revamped and modernized, the implications of 
the RMA for the future of Mississippi's corporate law should 
surely be explored. 
Finally, the history of the MBCA since its adoption demon­
strates the need for critical re-analysis. Since 1962, only a hand­
ful of amendments have occurred, almost all of them technical 
in nature. 9 Thus, substantive innovations in corporate law since 
Corporation Act Annotated to incorporate changes made since the 1971 edition and its 
1973 and 1977 supplements. A third supplement, however, was deemed less practicable 
than a new edition. Id. at xxv. Concurrently, a 1979 study of portions of the Model Act 
which had not been substantially revised since 1950 suggested numerous areas where the 
experience of various states indicated that significant simplifications and innovations 
could be made. Id. Among these would be a complete reorganization and renumbering of 
the Model Act. Id. Finally, the process of substantive amendments which had transpired 
since 1950 had resulted in a document internally inconsistent in format and drafting 
style. Id. Coupled with the need to incorporate post-1977 amendments and the Commit­
tee's determination to make further substantive amendments to the Model Act during 
the drafting process, the decision was made to develop the RMA. Id. 
An exposure draft of the RMA was circulated for comment in 1983. As will be fur­
ther discussed herein, the draft differs in many significant respects from the final prod­
uct. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS C ORP. ACT (Exposure Draft March 1983). After the 
receipt of extensive commentary and a re-analysis and substantial revision of the draft, 
the final draft was p ublished in 1984. 1 REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. xxxii­
:r.xxiii (3d ed. 1985). For further background o n  the RMA see Goldstein, Revision of the 
Model Business Corporation Act, 63 Tux. L. REV. 1471 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Gold­
stein]; Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business Corporatio n Act, 38 Bus. 
LAW. 1019 (1983); Hamilton, Reflections of a Reporter, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1455 (1985) (here­
inafter cited as Hamilton, Reflections]. 
• The following sections of the Act have been amended: §§ 79-3-15 (reservation of 
name increased to 180 days); 79-3-25 (increasing fee for service of process on Secretary of 
State); 79-3-37 (decreasing vote necessary to approve stock options to insiders and not to 
shareholders generally); 79-3-43 (dealing with facsimile signatures); 79-3-55 (60 days no­
tice of shareholders' meeting); 79-3-57 (closing of transfer books and record date in­
creased to 60 days before meeting); 79-3-67 (directors must be 18); 79-3-103 (single in­
corporator for professional corporation); 79-3-107 (eliminated publication requirement 
for certificate o f  incorporation); 79-3-119 (exempted regulated utilities); 79-3-123 (elimi­
nated publicatio n  requirement fo r  articles of amendment); 79-3-141 (allows conversion of 
shares of merging corporations into shares of corporation other than survivor); 79-3-142 
(merger of domestic corporations and business trusts); 79-3-147 (eliminated publication 
requirement for articles of merger or consolidation); 79-3-149 (eliminated p ublication re­
quirement for merger of subsidiary corporation); 79-3-159 (broadened dissenters' rights 
to include business combination as defined in 79-25-3(e)); 79-3-163 (eliminated publica­
tion requirement for articles of dissolution); 79-3-189 (various amendments involving ad­
ministrative suspension and dissolution); 79-3-209 (various amendments dealing with 
survival of remedies); 79-3-249 (technical amendments dealing with annual reports); 79-
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1962 have gone largely ignored. Moreover, a cursory �la?c� a� 
the Mississippi Digest and the Annotations to the M1ss1ss1pp1 
Code of 1972 illustrate dramatically the paucity of judicial inter­
pretation of the MBCA. As a result, significant ambi�uities. i� the Model Act which have been identified and extensively liti­
gated in other jurisdictions still plague Mississippi practitioners, 
who have no authoritative precedent to guide them.10 Moreover, 
Mississippi has little precedent on many common-law corporate 
issues which have in recent years been increasingly dealt with by 
statute.11 Finally, the only article critically analyzing the MBCA 
previously published in this Journal was of limited scope and is 
now more than ten years old.12 The purpose of this article, then, 
3-251 (technical amendments involving filing of annual reports); 79-3-253 (minor word­
ing change regarding fee collection); 79-3-255 (changing filing fees); 79-3-257 (changing 
miscellaneous charges); 79-3-259 (deleted penalty for failure to file annual report); 79-3-
269 (changed disposition of fees, charges and penalties). 
10 See, e.g., infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. Of course, an important goal 
of the drafters of the RMA was to respond to and clarify those ambiguities. 
11 See, e.g., infra notes 99-173 and accompanying text. In addition, that authority 
which does exist is, in some instances, confusing and outdated. The notoriou s  example is 
Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 6 99, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 97 (1957), the leading Mississippi opinion on director conflicts of interest. See 
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 386-90 (strict interpretation of opinion does not coin­
cide with commercial practices or practicalities); Comment, Transactions Between a 
Corporation and its Directors: Where Does Mississippi Stand?, 52 Miss. L.J. 877, 889-95 
(1982)(decision leaves many questions unanswered) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 
Transactions]. Knox Glass and general questions of director conflicts of interest are dis­
cussed more fully at infra notes 141-73 and accompanying text. 
12 See supra note 2. The authors of that article eschewed any effort at a comprehen· 
sive re-appraisal, focusing instead on four subjects: provisions designed to protect credi­
tors; P�ovisions designed for the protection of shareholders; provisions designed for the 
regulat�on of transactions with officers and directors; and provisions dealing with the 
protection of officers and directors. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 373-75. 
. 
As of the writing of this article, the only other published article dealing primarily 
with t
.
he MBCA is McLendon, Formation, Operation and Dissolution of Business Cor· 
porations, 39 Miss. L.J. 281 (1963), a summary of provisions of the then newly-adopted 
MBCA._ 
Other works dealing with the MBCA in some context include Dunn-Cooper, An 
A�lysis of Mississippi's Treatment of Foreign Corporations, 55 Miss. L.J. 259 (1985); 
0 Neal, Preventative Law: Tailoring the Corporate Form of Business to Ensure Fair 
Treatment of All, 49 Miss. L.J. 529 (1978) [hereinafter cited as O'Neal Preventative La
.







uggested Remedies, 4 7  Miss. L.J. 476 (1976). Other works deal-g with pnor M1ssiss1pp1 corporate laws include Roberds, The New Corporation Act, 2 
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is to examine selected portions of the RMA with a view towards 
suggested revisions to the Mississippi Act. One point should be 
made at the outset: this article does not advocate the wholesale 
adoption of the RMA in Mississippi. Specific reasons for this 
will be discussed in the context of the provisions of the RMA, 
but some philosophical rationales can be noted here. By admis­
sion of its authors, the RMA is meant to synthesize the recent 
experience of corporate drafters in "important commercial 
states."13 It may be fairly characterized as perpetuating the 
trend towards "permissiveness" that has been the dominant 
theme in corporate legislation following the adoption of the 1950 
Model Act.1• I would not presume to resolve conclusively the ac-
Miss. L.J. 179 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Roberds]; Comment, The Power of an Equity 
Court in Mississippi to Dissolue a Corporation, 15 Miss. L.J. 150 (1943). 
11 1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT ANN. xxiv (3d ed. 1985). 
" See, e.g., Branson, Countertrends in Corporate Law: Model Business Corporation 
Act Reuision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Gouernance 
and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REV. 53, 62 (1983)(arguing that in large part due to the 
Model Act, the enabling philosophy of corporate law has become dominant and the pro­
tection of shareholders abandoned as a major goal of corporation act drafters) [hereinaf­
ter cited as Branson, Countertrends]. Professor William Cary has noted that the original 
Model Act was intended to serve as an alternative to the "permissive" Delaware ap­
proach, which the Model Act drafters believed to afford insufficient protection to inves­
tors. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Refiections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 
665 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Cary, Federalism]. Cary believed that the process of 
amendment to the Model Act over the years represented a conscious effort to "out-Dela­
ware Delaware." Id.; cf. Garrett, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that the 1950 Model Act may 
not appeal to states soliciting corporate business). Professor Eisenberg has noted that 
the committee responsible for the Model Act was composed overwhelmingly of manage­
ment lawyers, and that management-oriented changes to the Act took place for many 
years with little or no comment from its drafters, e.g., the change from mandatory to 
permissive cumulative voting in 1955. Eisenberg, Model Act, supra note 3, at 1410, 1414-
15. 
In general, criticism of the trend towards permissive, or management-oriented stat­
utes, as opposed to regulatory, or investor-protective statutes, has been thematic in re­
cent corporate scholarship. See, e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New 
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 
1081 (1968)(practice of protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has 
been carried as far as it should be and perhaps further) [hereinafter cited as Bishop, 
Sitting Ducks]; Branson, Countertrends, supra note 14, at 53-62 (corporate law no 
longer has protection of shareholders at heart); Bulbulia & Pinto, Statutory Responses 
to Interested D irector Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 No­
TRE DAME L. REV. 201, 220-22 (1977)(statutory changes may work to disadvantage of 
minority shareholders) [hereinafter cited as Bulbulia & Pinto]; Cary, Federalism, supra, 
at 665-66 (shareholders rights watered down to thin gruel); Eisenberg, Model Act, supra 
170 MISSISSIPPI LAW JO URN AL 
[VOL. 56 
ademic debate as to the desirability of permissive rather than 
regulatory statutes; at a minimum the RMA displays a large cor­
poration orientation which in some instances would be clearly 
inappropriate, or at least unnecessary, in Mississippi, where the 
vast m ajority of domestically chartered corporations are closely­
held.15 
Thus, the methodology of this article is to compare t�e 
treatment of selected issues under the RMA and the MBCA m 
an effort to identify those areas of Mississip pi's law in need of 
revision. This process, however, does not inevitably lead to the 
conclusion that the. RMA should be adopted. Rather, the pur­
pose of this article is to suggest the most desirable approach to 
specific issues, whether the approach is that taken by the RMA, 
the current MBCA, or the statutes of other states. 
The potential scope of such an undertaking would, of 
course, be vast, since many of the myriad issues discussed herein 
would individually merit article-length treatment. This article, 
which will appear in two parts, is in the nature of an overview, 
suggesting subjects for further exploration and refinement. With 
the caveat that attempts at categorization may be arbitrary and 
of necessity overlap, Part 1 of this article will address the ques­
tion of corporate law reform in Mississippi in the areas of corpo­
rate formation and organization and corporate management and 
governance. Part 2, to be published in a subsequent issue, will 
n
_
o�e 3, at 1410, 1427-28 (severe imbalance of management lawyers in committee com
po­
s1t1on); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 
U. �A. L. REV. 861, 872-75 (1969)(three-way arrangement of corporate structures has led 




'�elf been q�estioned and criticized .  See, e.g., Fischel, The "Race to the Bott
om" 
Revisited: Refiectlons on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. 
U.L. REV. �13, 916-21 (19
.
82)(theoretical and empirical evidence does not support attack 
on
_ 
separation of o�ersh1p and control) [hereinafter cited as Fischel, Refiections]; H
eth­
erington, Rede�rung the Task of Corporation Law, 19 U.S.F.L. REv. 229, 235-248 
(1985)(assumptions regarding traditional corporate model were largely mistaken). 
A re.
lated but broader issue is that of the respective roles of management and share­
holders m corporate g?ver?ance and the necessity uel non of stricter standards of con­
�uct for managers. This will be further developed at infra notes 67-173 and accompany­
ing text. 
" Indeed, Pr�f�or O'Neal has noted the possible "big business bias" of 
the 
MBCA. �ased �8 it 18 on the Model Act and made applicable to both large and small 
corporat ions. 0 Neal, Preventative Law, supra note 12, at 534 n.24 . 
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discuss the areas of capitalization, organic changes, and issues of 
particular concern to close corporations. 
I. FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION 
A. Process of Incorporation 
Among the most salutary changes which would be effected 
by the RMA are those in the area of corporate formation. In 
general, the RMA would effectively accomplish three objectives: 
(1) streamlining and simplifying a procedure that is currently 
unjustifiably cumbersome; (2) responding to interpretative is­
sues that arose under the Model Act; and (3) clearly defining the 
legal role of the Secretary of State in the incorporation process. 
The MBCA follows a very traditional statutory scheme of 
incorporation: articles of incorporation including prescribed in­
formation18 must be signed and verified by two incorporators17 
and duplicate originals delivered to the Secretary of State.18 As­
suming that the Secretary determines that the articles "conform 
to law," the certificate of incorporation is issued and returned 
together with a duplicate original of the articles.19 Although the 
publication requirement was eliminated in 1983,20 the certificate 
must be recorded in the chancery clerk's office in the county of 
the corporation's principal place of business.21 Upon issuance of 
the certificate, the corporation is deemed to exist.22 
The thrust of Chapter 1 of the RMA is twofold: to eliminate 
much of what is unnecessary under traditional statutes such as 
the MBCA, and to provide needed clarification and definition to 
much that previously was unstated or ambiguous. For example, 
under the RMA only one incorporator is required, and the incor-
19 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-105 (1972). 
17 Miss. CODE ANN.§ 79-3-103 (1972 ). The incorporators must be natural persons of 
the age of 21. Id. 
18 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-107 (1972). 
lt Id. 
10 1983 Miss. Laws 403, § 2, amending Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-107 (1972). 
11 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-01 (1972 ). 
11 Miss. CODE ANN.§ 79-3-109. As to the relationship of this section to common law 
doctrines of de ju re and de facto corporations and corporation by estoppel see infra 
notes 53-66 and accompanying text. 
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porator can be either a person or an entity.23 Only one original 
and one conformed copy need be filed, 24 and the articles need 
not be verified.211 The prescribed information in the articles is 
greatly reduced,26 and the corporate existence made perpetual 
unless otherwise provided.27 There is no necessity to include a 
purpose clause unless a more limited purpose than the transac-
23 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 1.40, 2.02 (1984). Given the purely formal 
and limited nature of the incorporator's role under modern statutes, and the pervasive 
use of corporation service companies in interstate incorporation transactions, there ap­
pears no need to have a natural person as incorporator, and certainly no rationale to 
require more than one. The Model Act's historical justification for requiring multiple 
incorporators (the 1950 Model Act required three) appears to have been a somewhat 
irrational prejudice against "one-person" corporations. See Garrett, supra note 3, at 3 
(requirement of multiple inc orporators is firmly established in most states although re­
garded as fictional in many cases). 
Curiously, the RMA is ambiguous in one respect: it sets no minimum age for an 
individual to be either an incorporator or a director. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CORP. ACT 
§§ 2.01, 8.03 (1984). While the RMA permits corporations to prescribe qualifications for 
members of the board, it is unclear whether this contemplates a minimum age limitation. 
See id. § 8.02 & official comment. Under present Mississippi law, incorporators must be 
21 and directors 18. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-67, -103 (1972 and Supp. 1985). Quaere 
whether the common law age of capacity, 21, would impliedly prohibit a younger person 
from serving in these capacities. 
u REVISED MODEL BUSINESS Co RP. ACT § l.20(i)(1984). A duplicate original can, of 
course, suffice as a conformed copy. Id. official comment. 
•a Id. § l.20(g). The RMA makes verification or acknowledgement optional for all 
documents filed pursuant thereto. Id. 
16 The articles need state only the corporate name, number (but not par value) of 
authorized shares, street address of the initial registered office and initial registered 
agent; and name and address of each incorporator. Id. § 2.02(a). All other information 
and provisions are optional. Of course, certain provisions must appear in the articles if 
they are to apply. Provisions which are mandatory are those regarding a limited purpose; 
managing the business and affairs of the corporation; defining, limiting, and regulating 
the powers of the corporation, board, or shareholders; par value of shares; and imposition 
of personal liability on shareholders. Id. § 2.02(b)(2)(i).(u). 11 Id. § 3.02. Like the MBCA, the R M A  contains an extensive grant of general pow­
ers; these need not be repeated in the articles. Id. § 2.02(c); see Miss. CODE ANN.§ 79-3-7 
(197 2). The broad powers of § 3.02, coupled with the adoption of a n  "any lawful busi· 
ness" purpose provision, should virtually eliminate the possibility of an ultra vires attack 
on a transaction, unless of course the corporation has elected to limit its purpose. RE­
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.02 official comment (1984); see infra note 28 (gen­
eral powers of corporation). Nonetheless, the RMA retains a provision defining the scope 
of the ultra vires doctrine. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 3.04 (1984). The Mis­
sissippi provision is substantially the same. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-11 (1972). 
. I� should be noted that the adoption of the RMA in this regard would require con· 
s�1tut1onal amendment, since "private corporation[s) for pecuniary gain" are constitu­
t1onally limited in Mississippi to a duration of 99 years. Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 178. 
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tion of "any lawful business" is desired.28 The Secretary of 
State's duty of filing is ministerial in nature; no longer is he re­
quired to determine if the articles conform to law.29 In addition, 
the Secretary is not required to issue a certificate of incorpora­
tion, b ut rather only to return the document copy to the corpo­
ration. so The articles are effective and the corporate existence 
begins upon filing, unless a delayed effective time and date are 
•• REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 3.0l(a) {1984). The RMA deems a corpora­
tion to be organized for any lawful purpose unless a more restricted purpose is stated in 
the articles. Id. § 2.02(b)(l). 
While restrictive purpose clauses may sometimes be used to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, the mandate for the specific purpose clause under the MBCA may 
serve no rational function, other than to test the ingenuity of drafters to phrase the 
purpose for which the corporation is organized in sufficiently broad terms to permit the 
transaction of any lawful business. See Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-105(c) (1972)(specific 
purpose or purposes for which corporation is organized shall be set forth, stated in gen­
eral terms). Any supposed informational function to shareholders is negated by the fact 
that few, if any, shareholders of any corporation, whatever its size, ever examine its arti­
cles. Moreover, elimination of any requirement of specificity removes the possibility of a 
drafter unwittingly creating a potential ultra vires challenge. 
Currently at least 34 states permit the use of "any lawful purpose" or similar 
clauses. ALA. CODE § 10-2A-91 (1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-054 (1977); CAL. CORP. 
CoDE § 202 (West 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-2-102 (Supp. 1985); CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN., §§ 33-290 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
607.164 (West 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-11 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54 
(1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 11 2.10 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-22-l(a) 
(Burns Supp. 1986); low A CODE ANN. § 496A.49 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT ANN.§ 17-
6002 (1981); Kv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271A.270 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 12.24 
(West 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1202 (West 1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
202 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2052 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.035 (1985); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:54 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 14A:2-7, 14A:3-1(2) (West 1969); 
N . M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2 {1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402 (McK inney 1986); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 55-7 (1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 1701.04 (Page 1985); OR. REV. STAT.§ 
57-311 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1204, 1302 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-
1.1-48 (1985); TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 3.02 (Vernon 1980); VA. CODE § 13.1-626 
(Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A:12.020 (Supp. 1986); Wisc. STAT. ANN.§ 
180.45 (West 1957); Wvo. STAT.§ 17-1-202 (1977). The new Tennessee Business Corpora­
tion Act, effective O ctober 1, 1987, enacts the RMA provision. 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887, 
§ 3.01. 
38 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 1.25(d) & official comment 1 (1984); see 
infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text. 
ao The need for formal certificates of corporate acts is unclear, and the RMA wisely 
eliminates the requirement that the Secretary issue certificates of incorporation, merger, 
or similar documents. REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 1.25(b) & official comment 
3 (1984). 
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specified in the articles.31 The RMA does not require either pub­
lication of notice or recording in any public office other than 
that of the Secretary of State. The provisions of the RMA and 
MBCA dealing with the organizational meeting and adoption of 
bylaws are substantively similar. 32 
B. Secretary of State 
In addition to miscellaneous simplifying provisions,33 a sec­
ond major contribution of the RMA is the clarification of the 
role of the Secretary of State. Early corporate statutes com­
monly provided for substantive review of articles of incorpora­
tion by a state official. 34 As previously noted, the MBCA charges 
the Secretary of State with the responsibility of determining 
that articles of incorporation "conform to law" before issuance 
•1 Id. §§ 1.23, 2.03(a). The RMA requires the Secretary to maintain a date and time 
stamp that will eliminate any ambiguities as to effective time. Id. § l.23(a) & official 
comment. Filing is made conclusive proof that all conditions precedent to incorporation 
have been met, except in proceedings brought by the state. Id. § 2.03(b). As to the effect 
of the RMA on the issue of preincorporation transactions, see infra notes 53-66 and 
accompanying text. 
12 Compare REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 2.05-2.06 (1984)(where initial 
directors are named they shall hold organizational meeting of majority of directors; in­
corporators on board of directors shall adopt initial bylaws) with Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 79-
3-51, -113 (1972)(bylaws adopted by board which also has power to amend or repeal 
unless power is reserved to shareholders; organizational meeting shall b e  called by major­
ity of incorporators and three days notice thereof shall be given by mail). In addition, 
the RMA includes a provision dealing with emergency bylaws which does not appear in 
the MBCA but which has been adopted in a number of states. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS 
CORP. ACT § 2.07 (1984). 
0 E.g., the RMA allows a document containing an "incorrect statement" or one de­
fectively executed to be corrected by filing "articles of correction," thus eliminating the 
necessity of either refiling or submitting formal articles of amendment to correct minor 
errors .  REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § l.24(a) (1984). The correction relates back 
to the date of the original filing except as to persons who detrimentally rely upon the 
original document before correction. Id. § 1.24(c). In addition, the RMA permits a corpo­
r�tion to change its registered office o r  agent simply by filing a statement of change 
�1thout any s�areholder or formal board action. Id. § 5.02. Under the MBCA, this seem­
mgly mechamcal act can be accomplished only by formal resolution of the board and 
subsequent filing with the Secretary of State. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-23 (1972). There 
appears to be no reason for formal documentation of board approval for this to be 
effected. 
•• See, e.g., Roberds, supra note 12, at 179-80 (noting authority of governor to regu­
l�te amount of paid-in capital before approving charter under 1 9 28 Mississippi Corpora­
tion Act). 
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of the charter.36 The scope of the Secretary of State's duties 
under such provisions is somewhat unclear: is he merely to re­
view the charter for technical compliance with the minimum 
standards of the Act, or is he also charged with determining the 
substantive legality or relevance of provisions which may go be­
yond the b are statutory requirements? If the latter is the stat­
ute's meaning, one may then question whether the Secretary of 
State's office is adequately staffed to render a competent judg­
ment on such matters, as well as the appropriateness of granting 
the Secretary broad substantive discretion in such areas. Ex­
isting case law on these issues, unsurprisingly, has y ielded some­
times contradictory results. 36 
•a Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-107 (Supp. 1986). Similar language is employed regarding 
articles of amendment, restated articles of incorporation, amendment of articles of incor­
poration in reorganization, statements of reduction in capital, articles of merger or con­
solidation, articles of merger of a 95% subsidiary, articles of dissolution by act of the 
incorporators, shareholders or corporation, revocation of dissolution proceedings, appli­
cation for certificate of authority of a foreign corporation, application for withdrawal of a 
foreign corporation, and annual reports. Id. § §  79-3-121, -127, -129, -137, -147, -149, -163, 
-165, - 169, -179, - 185, -221, -234, -251 (1972 and Supp. 1986). 
Currently at least 21 states have adopted comprehensive provisions dealing with the 
Secretary of State's duty in filing documents. ALA. CooE § 10-2A-93 (1980); ARK. STAT. 
ANN. § 64-1 17 ( 1980); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1 10 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
285 (West 1960); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 8, § 103 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-5 (1982); 
IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.53 (West 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6003 (1981); Mn. CORPS. & 
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § §  1-201, -202, -204 (1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 1568, § 6 (West 
1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1131 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.Oll(ll) 
(West 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 104 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 54-4 (1982); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.08 (Page 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1010 (Purden 1967); 
S.C. CooE ANN. § 33-1-60 (Law. Co-op 1977); 1986 TENN. Pue. AcTS 887, § 1.35 (effective 
Oct. 1, 1987); WASH. REv. ConE ANN . § 23A.04.010(9)(17)(Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 
180.86 (West 1957). The standards expressed defining the scope of the secretary's discre­
tion varies somewhat from state to state; in some, no standard whatsoever is defined. 
ae E.g., compare State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 1 1 2, 313 N.E.2d 847, 
848 (1974)(upholding authority of secretary to refuse articles of incorporation of non­
profit corporation whose purpose was the promotion of homosexuality on grounds that 
this was unlawful and contravened public policy) with Gay Activitists Alliance v. 
Lomenzo, 31 N. Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 256 (1973)(secretary wrongfully refused arti­
cles of incorporation of nonprofit corporation with purpose of seeking repeal of laws dis­
criminating against homosexuals; secretary lacked authority to determine that certain 
purposes violate public policy or that proposed names are inappropriate). 
For other examples, see Smith v. Director, Corporate & Sec. Bureau, 79 Mich. App. 
107, 261 N.W.2d 228, 230-31 (1977)(state official had authority to reject article stating 
purpose of lending money at interest rates in excess of seven percent, then maximum 
rate permitted under Michigan's usury law); Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 
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The RMA provides that the Secretary has an express duty 
to file all documents which satisfy the requirements of the Act,37 
and that this duty is "ministerial."38 By so doing, the RMA lim­
its the Secretary's discretion to matters of technical compliance. 
Thus, he would have no authority to reject a document because 
he believes that it contains provisions that are irrelevant or that 
violate legal principles not contained in the Act. 39 The RMA 
properly recognizes that the Secretary's office is not the appro­
priate forum for such challenges to corporate documents. 
Another area in which the proper role of the Secretary has 
engendered controversy is that of corporate names. As is true of 
the vast majority of state statutes,40 the MBCA requires that a 
corporation's name include words denoting corporateness, i.e., 
corporation, company, incorporated, or limited, or an abbrevia­
tion thereof.•1 The RMA maintains this requirement.42 By far 
the most common problem in the area of corporate names, how­
ever, is that of similarity to that of an existing corporation cur­
rently registered in the state. The MBCA provides that a corpo­
rate name must not be "the same as, or deceptively similar to," 
that of an existing domestic corporation or a previously qualified 
N.W.2d 583, 588 (N.D. 1971)(articles of corporation with purpose of farming properly 
rejected where statutes prohibited all but qualified cooperative corporations from engag­
ing in farming and limited power to own rural real estate); LeForce v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 
297, 304 (Okla. 1969)(secretary wrongfully refused to file articles of farming corporation 
on ground that state constitution and statutes prohibited a corporation from farmi�g 
since they prohibited corporate ownership of land; corporation can be formed 10 
Oklahoma for general purpose of engaging in farming with power of owning real estate); 
State ex rel. Church v. Brown, 165 Ohio St. 31, 133 N.E.2d 333, 335-36 (1956)(secretarY 
properly rejected articles of corporation whose purpose was to provide private facilities 
for the practice of nudism; formation of corporation would violate indecent exposure 
statute). 
. 
., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § l .25(a) (1984). In order to be eligible for 
fihng,
_ 
all docu�ents must contain the information required by the RMA and conform to 
technical requirements of form and execution. Id. § 1.20. 
H Id. § l.25 (d). 
"" Id. § 1.25 official comment 1. 
'° Only Maine, Massachusetts, Utah, and Wyoming have no such general require­
ment. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 301 (1981); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 11 
(West 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-7 (1973); Wvo. STAT. § 1 7-1-107 (1977). 
41 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-13(a)(1972). 
•• REVISED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT § 4.0l(a). 
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foreign corporation.43 The use of a "deceptive similarity" stan­
dard, however, may suggest an inappropriate overlap with the 
law of unfair competition. Under both the federal and Missis­
sippi trademark statutes, the general test for registrability of a 
trademark is that it not "be likely ... to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive." ' Inherent in the "likelihood of 
confusion" test applied under trademark law, however, is not 
only similarity in name but also the competitive nature of the 
businesses pursued by competing claimants.'� 
In some instances courts have held that unfair competition 
standards govern the results under corporate name statutes as 
well.'6 The resources of the Secretary of State may, however, be 
inadequate to make such a judgment, and the possibility of in­
consistency is evident.47 The RMA adopts the test "distinguisha­
ble upon the records of the Secretary of State" for determining 
the right to use a corporate name. This formulation makes it 
clear that similarity in an absolute or linguistic sense, and not 
confusion, is the appropriate test since the function of requiring 
0 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3- 13(c)(1972). 
0 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)(1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-3(f)(1972). Unlike many 
states, Mississippi has no statute dealing with the registration of trade or assumed 
nanies. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & Paor. CODE §§ 14411-417 (West Supp. 1 986)(filing of ficti­
tious name raises rebuttable presumption of exclusive right to use as trade name); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-1 (West Supp. 1986)(assumed name under which business is to be 
conducted must be filed); Mien. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1-445.5 (West Supp. 
1986)(same); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 130 (McKinney Supp. 1986)(same); VA. CooE ANN. §§ 
59.1-69 to 59.1-76 (1982 & Supp. 1986)(same). 
41 See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken v. Diversified Packaging, 549 F.2d 368, 388 (5th 
Cir. 1977)(confusion with respect to product's source, its indorsement by plaintiff, or its 
connection with plaintiff). 
•• See, e.g., Couhig's Restaway Co. v. Pestaway, Inc., 278 So. 2d 519, 521 (La. App. 
1973)(substantially same test as applied in determining infringement of proprietary right 
to trade name). 
'7 An interesting case illustrating this point is Ergon, Inc. v. Dean, 649 S.W.2d 772 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983). Ergon, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, qualified to do business in 
Texas in 1973. Id. at 774. In 1978, the Secretary of State of Texas issued a charter to 
Nova Energy Corporation, which shortly thereafter changed its name to Ergon Energy 
Corporation. Id. Both Ergon and Ergon Energy were engaged in similar businesses. Id. at 
775. Ergon sought to compel the Secretary to revoke approval of Ergon Energy's corpo­
rate name and also relief under the Federal Trademark Act. Id. at 773. The court, rely­
ing heavily upon regulations promulgated by the Secretary, upheld his decision to allow 
Ergon Energy to use its corporate name, but further held that Ergon Energy had in­
fringed upon Ergon's federal trademark. Id. at 776-80. 
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distinguishable names in a corporate statute is to prevent confu­
sion by the Secretary and taxing authorities, and to permit accu­
rate service of process.48 Under the RMA, no issues of the appro­
priate relationship between corporate law and unfair 
competition standards should arise.•11 
The RMA contains a number of clarifying features not pre­
sent in earlier versions of the Model Act. One is an extensive set 
of definitions.110 Perhaps even more helpful is a prescribed proce­
dure for giving notice and rules defining when notice becomes 
effective.111 The RMA also relieves the Secretary of State of an 
unnecessary responsibility by providing that in the event that 
service of process cannot be made on a corporation's registered 
agent, the corporation can be served by registered or certified 
mail addressed to the secretary of the corporation at its princi­
pal office shown in its most recent annual report.112 
•• REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT. § 4.01 & official comment 2 (1984). 
•• The RMA carries forward other provisions from the 1969 Model Act relating to 
corporate names which would be desirable additions to Mississippi Jaw. The first is a 
consent procedure to permit the use of similar names. The 1969 Model Act allowed a 
corporation to use a name that would be otherwise unavailable if it could obtain the 
written consent of the holder of the conflicting name and, if necessary, add one or more 
words to the new name to make it distinguishable. MoDEL Bus1NESS CORPORATION Acr § 
8(c)(l969). A majority of states have adopted this or similar provisions. 1 REVISED MoDEL 
BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 252 (1985). While the Secretary of State of Mississippi ha
s 
followed this practice on an informal basis, a codified procedure is preferable. The sub­
stance of the 1969 amendment is incorporated in REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr 
§ 
4.0l(c) (l.)(1984). In addition, the RMA authorizes the use of an indistinguisha
ble name if 
the applicant can produce a judgment of a court of final jurisdiction establishing its righ
t 
to the name. Id. § 4.0l(c)(2). 
The pro�isions of the MBCA and RMA dealing with reserved and registered names 
a�e substantially the same; the primary difference is that the RMA makes the reserva­
tion of a corporate name nonrenewable. Compare Miss. CODE ANN. § §  79-3-15, -17 (1972 
& Supp. 1985)(name reserved for period of 180 days) with REVISED MoDEL Busnmss 
CORP .. A� §§ 4.02, 4.03 (1984)(only single, one time reservation of 120 days is pro
vided).  
Nothmg m the RMA, however, prohibits an applicant from reapplying for reservatio
n 




REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 4.02 official comment (1984). 
See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.40 (1984)(definitions of terms used 
throughout Model Act collected in single section). 01• Id. § 1.41. Notice provisions included in a corporation's articles or bylaws ar
e 
effec;:ve to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Act. Id. § 1.4l(g). . 
Id. § 5.o4(b) & official comment. Under the MBCA the Secretary of State 
18 
deemed to be a corporat1'on's t h · . . ot be agen w en a registered agent 1s not appomted or cann found. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-25 (1972). Service must therefore be made on the Sec
re-
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C. Liability for Preincorporation Obligations 
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One of the most troublesome interpretative questions aris­
ing under earlier versions of the Model Act was its impact on the 
problems falling within the general rubric of defective incorpora­
tion. The classic case involved liabilities incurred before all for­
mal conditions precedent to incorporation were met. The com­
mon law addressed the question of the potential liability of 
individuals acting on the corporation's behalf by the doctrines of 
de jure corporation, de facto corporation, or corporation by es­
toppel. So long as substantial compliance with the necessary 
steps to incorporation was effected, a de jure corporation would 
exist which was generally immune from either direct or collat­
eral attack by the state or any other party.63 Conversely, al­
though the substantial compliance standard was not met, courts 
would recognize a de facto corporation where (1) there was a 
statute under which the corporation might have been validly or­
ganized, (2) a colorable attempt was made to comply with the 
statute, and (3) there was some exercise of corporate powers. A 
de facto corporation was safe from collateral challenge but could 
be attacked directly by the state in a quo warranto or similar 
tary, who forwards it to the corporation at its registered office. Id. No reason for the 
Secretary's intervention appears to exist. 
A related technical problem exists concerning the resignation of a registered agent. 
Under the MBCA a resigning agent is to notify the Secretary, who then sends a copy of 
the notice to the corporation "at its registered office." Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-23 (1972). 
In many instances, however, that will be the address of the resigning agent, with the 
anomalous result that the resigning agent receives the notice of its resignation. Thus, the 
RMA provides for the Secretary to forward the notice to the corporation's registered 
office, if not discontinued, and to its principal office as shown on its annual report. RE­
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5.03(b)(l984). 
Ila 8 w. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3799 (rev. 
perm. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as W. FLETCHER); A. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF 
CORPORATIONS § 139, at 327-28 (3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited 88 HENN & ALEXANDER]. 
Of course, this begs the question somewhat 88 to what constitutes "substantial compli­
ance." One standard sometimes articulated is that the noncompliance be "slight." A. 
FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 34 (2d 
ed. 1977). A distinction is sometimes drawn between "directory" and "mandatory" provi­
sions, a directory provision being an inconsequential one, noncompliance with which 
does not prejudice any public interest. W. FLETCHBR. supra, § 3800; HENN & ALEXANDER, 
supra, at 328. An example would be the incorrect street address of an incorporator. For 
examples of other directory provisions see lA W. Fl.ETcHER, supra, § 132. 
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action.114 Finally, regardless of the degree of compliance with in­
corporation procedures, one dealing with a purported corpora­
tion could, under the principle of corporation by estoppel, be 
precluded from denying its existence.1111 
The former Model Act contained two provisions relating to 
these issues. Section 56 provided: 
Upon the issuance of the certificate of incorporation, the 
corporate existence shall begin, and such certificate of incorpo­
ration shall be conclusive evidence that all conditions prece­
dent required to be performed by the incorporators have been 
complied with and that the corporation has been incorporated 
under this Act, except as against this State in a proceeding to 
cancel or revoke the certificate of incorporation or for involun­
tary dissolution of the corporation.ae 
Section 146 of the Model Act provided that " (a]ll persons who 
assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do shall 
be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities in­
curred or arising as a result thereof."117 
The drafters of the Model Act took the position that these 
sections abrogated the de facto corporation concept and that 
nothing less than full compliance with the statute could create a 
corporation. 58 Given the simplicity of the incorporation proce-
.. 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 3761; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 14o, 
at 329-330. The doctrine of de facto corporation has also been applied where a condition 
precedent to doing business, as opposed to incorporation has not been met. See, e.g., In 
re 
_
Es�te 0� Har�in, 218 So. 2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1969)(f�ilure to comply with minimUJJl 
paid�!n capital did not deprive corporation of de facto status). W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, §§ 3889, 3910; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 
141• at 3�5- ,In a�dition, those acting as a corporation may be estopped from denying 
the 
corporation s existence. W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 3930; HENN & ALEXANDER. supra note 53• § l41; see, e.g., Taylor v. Aldridge, 180 Miss. 635, 643, 178 So. 331, 33
2:
33 
(l938H�ennessee corporation doing business in Mississippi without qualifying as foreig
n 
corp�atJon estopped from denying its existence). . M?DE7 BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r § 56 (1969). Mississippi adopted this provision with the sub&t1tutton of the word "chapter" for "Act ,, M C A § 79-3-109 (1972). 
17 M B 
. ISS. ODE NN. . h ODEL USINESS CORP. Ac-r § 146 (1969). Mississippi adopted this provision wit 
-
out �ange. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-285 (1972). The comment to § 56 stated th t " d . · t der the M ,, . a a e facto corporat10n cannot ex1s 
un 
odel Act. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r § 56 comment (1969). Moreover, the drafters stated that the purpose f § 146 " . . of de f 
0 was to proh1b1t the application of any theory acto corporation." Id. § 146 comment. Other authorities have commonly agreed. See, 
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dure under the Model Act, the logic of this argument seems 
sound. Nonetheless, not all courts have accepted the dictum of 
the drafters, the Supreme Court of Mississippi being an 
example.�9 
By far the more troublesome question is whether the doc­
trine of corporation by estoppel was affected by the Model Act 
and similar state statutes. Since the doctrine is equitable in na­
ture and is based on a course of conduct rather than any ques­
tion of statutory compliance, a convincing argument could be 
made that it was not abrogated by the Model Act. Two well­
known cases, decided in the same year, reached opposite conclu­
sions on the issue. In Robertson v. Levy,t•0 the C ourt of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia held that the Model Act abrogated 
both the doctrines of de facto corporation and corporation by 
estoppel. Noteworthy in that case, however, was that the person 
acting on behalf of the purported corporation was aware that the 
charter had not been issued at the time that the obligation was 
incurred. Conversely, in Cranson v. International Business Ma­
chines Corp. ,81 the Supreme Court of Maryland applied the doc­
trine of corporation by estoppel despite the presence of a statute 
substantively identical to Section 56 of the Model Act. In that 
case, however, the individual defendant was unaware of the non­
existence of the corporation, the party at fault being his lawyer 
who had failed for seven months to file the articles. Subsequent 
cases have split on the issue,82 although some states have ex-
e.g., 8 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 3762.1. 
61 See In re Estate of Hardin, 218 So. 2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1969)(failure to comply 
with minimum paid-in capital did not deprive corporation of de facto status); Gulf Land 
& Dev. Co. v. McRaney, 197 So. 2d 212, 217 (Miss. 1967)(de facto corporation exists 
where good faith attempt made under existing Jaws to organize corporation for specific 
purpose and corporation has exercised corporate functions for indefinite time). 
eo 197 A.2d 443 (D.C.C. App. 1964), noted in 43 N.C.L. REV. 206 (1964). But see 
Namerdy v. Generalcar, 217 A.2d 109, 112 (D.C. App. 1966)(corporation by estoppel 
applied). 
-. 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d 33 (1964), noted in 10 Vn.L. L. Rsv. 166 (1964). 
19 E.g., compare Thompson & Green Mach. v. Music City Lumber Co., 683 S.W.2d 
340, 344 (Tenn. App. 1984)(both de facto corporation and corporation by estoppel elimi­
nated in Tennessee) with Harris v. Stephens Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 54 Ala. App. 
405, 309 So. 2d 115, 117-18 (1975) and Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 165 N.J. 
Super. 411,  398 A.2d 571, 573 (1979)(both applying corporation by estoppel). 
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pressly preserved the estoppel doctrine by statute. 63 
The RMA clarifies the intent of former section 146 by now 
providing that " [a]ll persons purporting to act as or on behalf �f 
a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this 
Act, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created 
while so acting."8' The drafters of the RMA concluded as a pol­
icy matter that in certain situations the recognition of limited 
liability would be appropriate notwithstanding the failure to 
comply with statutory formalities, with the overriding considera­
tion being the good faith of the persons so acting.86 The RMA, 
then, strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of 
participants in the corporate enterprise and third parties dealing 
with it, and is consistent with recent decisions of the Mississippi 
Supreme Court dealing with liability of persons who conduct 
business after the suspension of a corporation's charter.88 
11 An earlier Minnesota statute preserved both de facto corporation and corporation 
by estoppel. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.08 (West 1980), repealed by 1981 M1NN. LAWS 270, § 
142. The comments to its present act take the position that the de facto corporation 
doctrine has been eliminated, but that the estoppel doctrine is unaffected. Reporter's 
Notes to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.153 (West 1985). The Georgia Corporation Code pro· 
videa that "(t]he existence of a corporation claiming a charter under color of law cannot 
be collaterally attacked by persons who have dealt with it as a corporation. Such persons 
are eatopped from denying its corporate existence." GA. CODE ANN. § 14-5-4 ( 1982). In 
Cahoon v. Ward, 231 Ga. 872, 204 S.E.2d 622, 624-25 (1974), the Supreme Court of Geor­
gia construed this aa preserving the doctrine of corporation by estoppel which would 
otherwise have been eliminated by adoption of provisions identical to Model Act Sec­
tions 56 and 146. But see Don Swann Sales Corp. v. Echols, 160 Ga. App. 539, 287 S.E.2d 
577, 580 (1981)(corporation by estoppel should not be applied to protect individual pur­
porting to act for non-existent corporation from liability on contract executed in corpo­
ration'11 name). 
" RBvlHll Moon BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04 ( 1984)(emphasis added) . 
.. Id. official comment. As the comment notes, equivalent protection is accorded to 
limited partners who contribute capital in the erroneous belief that the certificate of 
limited partnership has been filed. See, e.g., Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-13-23 ( 1972)(contribu· 
tor to capital of business erroneously believing he has become limited partner is not 
bound by partnership provided he renounces his interest in profits of business). 
Moreover, the comments state that, despite the lack of specific language to this ef­
fect, § 2.04 is not intended to foreclose the application of estoppel in instances where the 
defendants are urged to execute contracts in the corporate name by persons who are 
aware that no corporation exists. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04 official com· 
ment (1984). 
" Compare Carolina Transformer Co. v. Anderson, 341 So. 2d 1327, 1 329-30 (Miss. 
1977)(owner and officer of corporation suspended for failure to file annual report liable 
under I 79·3-285 on contracts made in corporation's name after suspension) with Flana· 
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In summary, the provisions of Chapters 1 through 5 of the 
RMA provide a desirable basis for revision of the Mississippi 
Act. The RMA effectively accomplishes the dual goals of simpli­
fication and clarification of traditional laws dealing with the in­
corporation process. 
II. CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
A. Composition and Structure of Board of Directors 
The provisions of the RMA dealing with directors reflect 
not only widespread statutory developments but, in some in­
stances, innovations not yet commonly found in state general 
corporation statutes. A striking example of the latter is the abil­
ity, under some circumstances, to eliminate the board of direc­
tors entirely or limit its authority by provisions in the articles 
describing who is to perform all or part of the board's duties. 
This election is limited to corporations with fifty or fewer share­
holders. 67 While this is obviously practicable only for a close cor­
poration, the RMA would permit such action even in a state like 
Mississippi with no separate close corporation statute.68 
gan v. Jackson Wholesale Bldg. Supply Co., 461 So. 2d 761, 764-65 (Miss. 1984)(wife of 
deceased owner of suspended corporation, though director, not liable since she was not 
actively involved in the control and management of corporation, notwithstanding that 
corporation and its finances were intertwined with her household). 
•1 REVISED MODEL BusINESS CoRP. Acr § 8.0l(c)(1984). Such provisions are not, of 
course, uncommon in states with separate close corporation statutes. See, e.g., DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 351 ( 1983)(permitting management by shareholders). Related issues will be 
discussed in greater depth in Part 2 of this article. 
A more radical approach is taken in Minnesota, where any business corporation can 
be managed by its shareholders. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.201, 302A.457 (West 1985). 
The limitation in the RMA is consistent with the Close Corporation Supplement to the 
Model Act, which authorizes the elimination of the board in a statutoey close corporation 
hut would allow only existing corporations with 50 or fewer shareholders to amend its 
articles to elect close corporation status. MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CoRP. SUPPLEMENT §§ 
3(b), 21 ( 1983). An unusual feature of the supplement is that it would permit a new 
corporation to elect such status without regard to the number of shareholders. Id. § 3(a). 
.. The avowed purpose of the drafters of the RMA is to avoid the necessity of 
manipulating a corporation's capital structure in order to achieve a similar result. The 
classic case is Lehrmann v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222, 222 A.2d 800 (1966), which upheld 
the issuance to the corporation's attorney of a class of voting common stock without a 
significant equity interest in order to create a tie-breaking vote on the board. The RMA 
would permit the same result by express provision in the articles, without the necessity 
of creating a special class of stock. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr § 8.01 official 
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While relatively few corporations might avail themselves of 
this option, a provision of much wider appeal in the RMA is the 
elimination of the mandatory three member board. Surely no 
corporate practitioner in Mississippi has escaped the problems 
posed by the MBCA's insistence on three directors.69 In many 
instances, particularly where the corporation has fewer than 
three shareholders, this requirement forces the inclusion on the 
board of persons with no equity interest and possibly no other 
financial interest in the corporation. Attorneys particularly are 
often put in the awkward position of declining a c lient's request 
to serve. The potential liability of the inactive director is clear,70 
but this is not always an easy matter to explain to clients. A 
figurehead director in general serves no purpose and the require­
ment of multiple directors appears purely historical in nature.71 
Thus, the RMA wisely mandates only one director unless the 
articles or bylaws provide to the contrary.72 
comment (1984); cf. id. § 7.31 (dealing with voting agreements among shareholders). 
For a general discussion of the necessity uel non for a board of directors see Kessler, 
Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporat e  Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 696 (1960). Arguably, the mandate for cumulative voting i� § 194 of the Mississippi 
Constitution could prevent outright abolition of the board. Miss. CONST. art. VII, § Hl,4. 
Part 2 of this article will consider the desirability of separate close corporation treatment 
in Mississippi, as well as related issues involving shareholder control devices. 
•• Miss. ConE ANN. § 79-3-69 (1972). 
•• See, e.g. , Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814, 829 (198l)(es­
tate of inactive director held liable to bankruptcy trustees of corporation for over 
$l0,000,000 stolen from corporation by other directors).  This is not to say, of course, that 
attorneys do not often play a useful role as directors of many companies. For a summary 
of arguments both supporting and criticizing this practice see Comment, Corporate 
Cou�el on the Board of Directors: An Overview, 10 CuM. L. REV. 791 (1980). 
71 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.03, at 805 (1985). . 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.03(a)(l984). The Model Act first elimi­
nated the three-director requirement in 1969. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 36 (1969). At 
least half the states now permit a one member board. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 
� 8·03• at 808 (l985). For general background on the issue see Rudolph, Further 
ho�
:ts on the On� and Two Director Statutes, 20 Bus. LAW. 781 (1965). 
. �
�MA contains two other provisions concerning board size that would be benefi
-
cial add1t1ons t? Mississippi's law. Under the MBCA, the number of directors is fixed in the. �ylaws, which may be amended by the board unless that power is reserved by th
e 
:c es to the shar��o�ders. �1ss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-51, -69 (1972). In order to prevent 
ho bo
d' 
ard fro� �t1hzmg this power in a way which would fundamentally alter the 
ar s compos1t1on the RMA h'b"ts h 
· the 
be . 





of directors by more than 30 3 of the number of directors last approved by th
e 
s are o ders. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.03(b)( l 984). In addition, the RMA 
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The RMA contains numerous other provisions which would 
effect other desirable changes in the MBCA. For example, the 
RMA specifically sanctions the common practice in many states 
of allocating among different classes of stock the right to elect 
all or a specified number of directors.73 This is presently imper­
missible under the MBCA, which prohibits the issuance of com­
mon stock with no or limited voting rights, and mandates that 
all stock regardless of class (except preferred stock) have one 
vote per share on each matter submitted to shareholders.74 This 
provision of the RMA might, however, run afoul of the constitu­
tional m andate of cumulative voting in Mississippi.76 For rea­
sons which will be more fully explained later, this article recom­
mends the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting,76 which 
would make available this potentially valuable structural device. 
Under the MBCA, the power to remove directors77 and to 
fill vacancies78 on the board is vested solely in the shareholders. 
The RMA would change this in two respects. First, the RMA 
provides a machinery for the judicial removal of a director. The 
standard for removal is that "(1)  the director engaged in fraudu­
lent or dishonest conduct, or gross abuse of authority or discre­
tion, with respect to the corporation and (2) removal is in the 
best interest of the corporation. "79 The suit may be brought ei­
ther by the corporation or by a shareholder suing derivatively on 
its behalf, or directly by the holders of ten percent or more of 
specifically sanctions the widely used device of providing for a variable size board in the 
bylaws. As a matter of shareholder protection, however, once shares are issued only the 
shareholders can change the range or change from a fixed to a variable size board, or vice 
versa. The specific number of directors within the range would then be determined by 
either the shareholders or directors as provided in the articles or bylaws. Id. § 8.03(c). 
,. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.04 (1984). This, of course, is a commonly 
used control device in close corporations. 
" See Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-27, -63 (1972). This is apparently an outmoded ves­
tige of the common law's resistance to severing proprietary rights and control rights. See 
FREv, CHOPER, LEECH & MORRIS, supra note 53, at 541. 
" Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194; see HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 499 
n.33. 
Te See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text. 
n Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-75 (1972). 
?• Id. § 79-3-73. 
?• REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 8.09(a)(1984). 
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any class of stock.80 The existence of this power could be signifi­
cant, for example, in removing a director elected by cumulative 
voting. Under both the RMA81 and the MBCA82, such a director 
cannot be removed if votes sufficient for his e lection under cu­
mulative voting are cast against his removal. While there is au­
thority that a majority of shareholders have inherent power to 
remove a director for cause notwithstanding cumulative voting 
rights,83 sufficient uncertainty exists on the issue to make an ex­
plicit judicial alternative desirable.84 
The RMA also permits either the shareholders or directors 
to fill a vacancy on the board, unless otherwise provided in the 
articles. sr. In light of the logistical difficulties encountered by 
larger corporations in holding shareholders' meetings, this 
change in the MBCA 86 is recommended, particularly since the 
term of the new director is limited to the next shareholders' 
meeting at which directors are elected,87 and in all events the 
power can be reserved to the shareholders exclusively if 
appropriate. 88 
The RMA also streamlines some functional aspects of board 
'0 Any such derivative action would be subject to the procedural restrictions of the 
RMA. Id. § 7.40. 
:: REVISED MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT § 8.08(c)(l984). 
Miss"CoDE. 
ANN: § 79-3-75 (1972). In all material respects, the RMA and MBCA 
are substantively identical on the issue of shareh ld l 
.. 
o er remova . 
See Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852, 857-58 (1957)(stock­
holde� hav
f
e power to remove director for cause). There is a division of authority on the 
question o a court's general equity power to re d' E B 
North Ventur R 
move a uector. .g., compare rown v. 
a oad
_ 
De�. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 233, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 57 1  
( 1 963)(such power exists independent of stat ) . 
145 8 A 2d 46 48 (l939)( h . 
ute with Markovitz v. Markovitz, 336 Pa. 
• 
· 
· no sue inherent powers). 
,.. As the comments to the RMA · 
necessary in a publ1"c c t" d 
pomt out, the procedure may also be practicably orpora 1on ue to th I · t" al d' · · 'al 
shareholders' meeting. REVISED MODEL B 
e ogis IC 1fficult1es m effect�ng a spec1 
( 1 984). Moreover even absent 
1 . usi�ss CORP. AcT § 8.09 official comment 
• 
cumu at1ve voting supe · . . . 
. . 
higher than majority vote for sh h Id . 
• r-maJor1ty prov1s1ons reqmrmg a 
are o er action may 1 d al b l 
than the required percentage HEN & A 
prec u e remov for cause Y ess 
. N LEXANDER sup te 53 § 2 9 
" REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP A 
· ra no , 05, at 55 . 
tute less than a quorum 8 ma}·o 't f. hCT 
§ 8-lO(a). If the remaining directors consti-, n Y o t ose remai · h 
.. In Mississippi only sharehold 
mng ave power to fill the vacancy. 
ers can fill a v M 3 
( 1972).  Again, adoption of the RMA . h" 
acancy. 1ss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-7 in t is respect might · · · al 
amendment. See Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194 
necessitate constitution 
.. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. A� § 8 05(d) .. E 
. 
I I h Id · (1984) 
.
g . ,  m a c ose Y· e corporation wh h 
. 
ere 8 areholder action poses no real obstacle. 
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operation. For example, the RMA follows the widely-adopted 
trend of permitting the directors to meet by conference tele­
phone call, with each participating director deemed to be pre­
sent as if physically in attendance.89 In addition, while the 
RMA, like the MBCA,90 permits directors to act by unanimous 
written consent, the RMA specifically recognizes the common 
practice of using separate consent forms for all or some direc­
tors, and expressly provides that such action is effective upon 
the signature of the last director. 91 
The formalities of director action would also be affected by 
the RMA provisions on the quorum. The MBCA, 92 like the 
RMA, permits super-majority provisions in the articles or by­
laws increasing the quorum up to and including unanimity.93 
Unlike the MBCA, however, the RMA would allow the articles 
or bylaws to decrease the quorum to not less than one-third of 
the directors. 9' While election of this option would be inappro­
priate in most closely-held corporations, the flexib ility it would 
accord to public corporations has led to adoption o f  similar pro­
visions in a substantial number of states.96 This change is there­
fore recommended. 
An interesting contrast in approach to board functioning 
appears in the RMA and MBCA provisions concerning commit­
tees. The MBCA requires that authorization for the creation of 
committees be made in the articles or bylaws; however, its re­
strictions on delegable powers are rather narrow in scope.96 The 
11 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.20(b)(l984). The statute actually speaks 
in terms of "any means of communication by which all directors participating may si­
multaneously hear each other during the meeting,"· the wording of which would seem to 
embrace possible future advances in communications technology. Section 43 of the 
Model Act has permitted conference telephone meetings since 1973. See, Report of Com­
mittee on Corporate Laws-Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus. 
LAW. 947, 948 (1974). Mississippi is one of but five states that has no comparable provi­
sion. 2 REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT ANN. § 8.20, at 876 (1985). 
'0 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-283 (1972). 
" REVISED MODEL BusINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.2l(a), (b)(1984). 
11 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-77 (1972). 
91 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.24(a) & official comment (1984). 
H Id. § 8.24(b). 
ea See 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Acr ANN. § 8.24, at 903 (1985)(overview of 
state laws dealing with quorum). 
" Under the MBCA, committees cannot exercise the authority of the board in refer-
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RMA, conversely, empowers the board to create such commit­
tees as it desires unless restricted by the articles or bylaws;97 
however its list of non-delegable functions is considerably more ' . . 
detailed.98 In view of the almost universal use of committees m 
public corporations, the RMA approach appears the more rea­
sonable of the two. 
B. Management Duties 
1. Duty of Care. 
Section 67 of the MBCA provides that " [T]he business and 
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of direc­
tors. "98 Except in limited circumstances, however, the MBCA of­
fers no statutory guidance as to the specific content of this duty, 
the standard of conduct to which directors are held, or potential 
ence to amending the articles of incorporation, adopting a plan of merger or consolida· 
tion, recommending to the shareholders the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or 
other disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets of the corporation 
otherwise than in the usual and regular course of its business, recommending to the 
shareholders a voluntary dissolution of the corporation . or a revocation thereof, or 
amending the bylaws of the corporation. Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-79 (1972). 
11 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.25(a)(l984). 
•• Id. § 8.25(e), which provides: 
A committee may not, however: 
(1) authorize distributions; 
(2) approve or propose to shareholders action that this Act requires to be ap· 
proved by shareholders; 
(3) fill vacancies on the board of directors or any of its committees; 
(4) amend articles of incorporation pursuant to section 10.02; 
(5) adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws; 
(6) approve a plan of merger not requiring shareholder approval; 
(7) authorize or approve reacquisition of shares, except according to a formula 
or method prescribed by the board of directors; or 
(8) authorize or approve the issuance or sale or contract for sale of shares, or 
determine the designation and relative rights, preferences, and limitations of a 
class or series of shares, except that the board of directors may authorize a 
committee (or a senior executive officer of the corporation) to do so within 
limits specifically prescribed by the board of directors. 
Id. As with the MBCA, the RMA provides that delegation to a committee does not itself 
absolve the directors from their duties of management. Compare Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79· 
�-79 (1972)(del��ati?n "shall not operate to relieve the board . . .  of any responsibility 
1mp�sed by law ) 
.
with REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.25(0(1984)(creation, del· 
�ation to, or action by committee "does not alone constitute compliance by a director 
with the standards of conduct described in section 8.30"). 
" Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-67 (Supp. 1985). 
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liabilities for failure to meet any such standard as may be im­
posed.100 In addition, few Mississippi cases exist on the issue of 
mismanagement absent self-dealing or a conflict of interest. 101 
Thus there is but little authority concerning two distinct, but 
interrelated concepts: the duty of care and the business judg­
ment rule. 
In its simplest sense, the duty of care recognizes that as a 
corollary to their duties of management, directors may be liable 
to the corporation for negligence in the performance of those du­
ties.102 There exists, then, the possibility of liability for waste, 
100 Specific statutory liability is imposed upon directors who vote for or assent to (1) 
payment of an improper dividend or distribution, (2) an improper repurchase of shares, 
(3) distribution of assets in liquidation without adequate provisions for corporate obliga­
tions, (4) a loan to an officer or director or a loan secured by the corporation's shares, or 
(5) the commencement of business before the minimum capital of $1,000.00 has been 
paid in for shares. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972). This provision is derived from § 48 
of the Model Act. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ar:r § 48 (1969)(providing framework for 
first three instances listed above). 
101 Two leading cases each involve an element of self-dealing. In Landstreet v. 
Meyer, 201 Miss. 826, 29 So. 2d 653 (1947), the court held that the minority shareholders 
of a corporation had a right to enjoin the payment of the president's salary upon a show­
ing that it was clearly excessive and wasteful; however, the president had cast the decid­
ing vote on his salary. Id. at 833, 29 So. 2d at 655. In a more recent case, Home Tel. Co. 
v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992 (N.D. Miss. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 
1974), directors were held liable to the corporation for negligence in inducing the corpo­
ration to breach a merger agreement; however, in addition to the fact that this action 
had no corporate purpose, the court emphasized that the defendants personally benefit­
ted from the breach. Darley, 355 F. Supp. at 998. The case is one of very few in Missis­
sippi attempting to articulate the business judgment rule: "Although an officer is surely 
not liable for honest errors or mistakes in judgment when acting in good faith, this does 
not excuse mistakes where the loss is the result of failure to exercise ordinary care, skill 
and diligence." Darley 355 F. Supp. at 1000. While the court spoke in terms of negli­
gence, however, there was a clear conflict of interest on the part of the defendants which 
should have rendered any consideration of the business judgment rule moot. · See infra 
text accompanying note 112. 
In addition, a number of MiBBiBBippi cases, while not explicitly premised on the busi­
ness judgment rule, emphasize the tradition of judicial deference to the concept of ma­
jority rule in corporations. See, e.g., Crocker v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 293 So. 2d 
438, 442 (Miss. 1974)(court should not enter area of corporate management except in 
cases where judicial action is essential to justice); Hudson v. Belzoni Equip. Co., 211 
Miss. 178, 188, 51 So. 2d 223, 226 (195l)(courts are not to control corporations except in 
cases where such control is essential to justice). 
101 See, e.g., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 234, at 621. For general back­
ground on the topic see 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 1035; Dyson, The Director's 
Liability for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341, 367-71 (1965); Lewis, The Business Judgment 
Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 
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mismanagement, or other acts resulting in loss to the corp?�a­
tion even absent self-dealing on the director's part. 103 Jud1c1al 
formulations of the content of this duty abound. A common ex­
pression of the duty is that care which "ordinarily careful. a�d prudent men would use in similar circumstances. "10" The M1ss1s­
sippi Supreme Court has described the standard as "that degree 
of care in managing [the corporation] that ordinarily prude�t 
and diligent men would exercise under similar circumstances m 
the conduct and management of their own business. "1 0� The 
157-60 (1970). 
10• The reality of that threat has been the source of no little debate. In a well-known 
article, Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr. argued that virtually no cases existed which im­
posed liability for breach of the duty of care in non-financial corporations without some 
component of self-dealing. Bishop, Sitting Ducks, supra note 14, at 1099. That argu· 
ment, however, has not gone unchallenged. See, e.g., Harris, Standards of Conduct 
Under Common Law, Present Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW. 61, 66 
(1972)(contending that reported cases do not reflect possibility that substantial numbers 
of such actions may have been settled out of court). Certainly, recent cases suggest that 
the duty of care has more than a mere exhortative function. See, e.g., Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985)(director's duty to exercise informed business 
judgment is in nature of duty of care); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 
A.2d 814, 824 (1981)(director's duty of care does not exist in abstract). 
1°' Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 84, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963). 
101 Boyd v. Applewhite, 121 Miss. 879, 897, 84 So. 16, 23 (1920). It is n oteworthy 
that Boyd, a case in which liability was imposed on directors for mismanagement, i�­
volved a banking corporation. It is commonly said that bank directors, due to their posi· 
tion of public trust, are held to higher standards of accountability than directors of other 
businesses. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) (director 
of bank, entrusted with funds of depositors and protection of stockholders, is held to 
stricter accountability than diretor of ordinary business corporation); 3A W. FLETCHER, 
supra note 53, §§ 1035, 1042 (undoubtedly director of bank held to stricter accountabil­
ity than director of ordinary business corporation); Bishop, supra note 14, at 1098 (bank 
director's mismanagement viewed as something worse than ordinary negligence). But see 
McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, 491 F.2d 380, 383 (2d Cir. 1974)(asserting 
that standard of care for directors of financial institutions is same as for directors of 
other corporations). 
There is some disagreement as to whether the use of the words " in the conduct and 
management of their own business" or similar language has been of significance in any 
r�ported c�se i�volving director liability. In any event, the clear consensus is that the 
d1�erence m this and the Model Act standard has no practical importance. See, e.g., 
Ch1ttur, The Corporate Director's Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 505, 510 & nn.33-41 (1985)(citing Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 224 A.2d 634 
(1966), as. represen.ting rare, if not only case in which inclusion of phrase "in their pe
r· 
sonal business affairs" has been determinative of outcome); Veasey & Manning, Codified 
Standard 
· Safe Harbor or Unchartered Reef? An Analysis of the Model Act Standard 
of Care Compared with Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919, 926-27 & n.36 (1979)(same). 
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level of p erformance required to discharge this duty is, however, 
unclear; authorities are divided as to whether ordinary negli­
gence, or gross negligence, is the test of liability.106 
In many instances, however, the question of the exact pa­
rameters of the duty of care is rendered moot because of the 
application of the business judgment rule: so long as a decision 
of the directors has a rational basis, and was made in good faith 
and for what they honestly believed to be in the best interest of 
the shareholders, it will not be reviewed by a court. 107 In its or­
dinary sense it serves as a defense for directors, who are thereby 
shielded from liability for honest mistakes of judgment. 108 The 
rule is traditionally justified on several bases: the recognition by 
courts of their inherent limitations in business matters and their 
concomitant reluctance to substitute their judgment for that of 
directors;109 the realization that directors are fallible and that 
persons of ability would be reluctant to serve as directors if the 
law imposed an unreasonably demanding degree of foresight;110 
109 See, e.g., Veasey & Manning, supra note 105, at 926-930 (asserting that there is 
no agreement on level of care required, and discussion of that conflict); Veasey & Seitz, 
The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the 
ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1483, 1493 (1985) (commentators do 
not agree on level of care required-ordinary negligence or gross negligence) [hereinafter 
cited as Veasey & Seitz]. 
1... 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 1039; HENN & .ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 
242, at 661. An excellent overview of this topic is found in Arsht, The Business Judg­
ment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Arsht). 
108 Veasey & Seitz, supra note 106, at 1484-85. 
A technical distinction is sometimes drawn by commentators between the business 
judgment rule and the business judgment doctrine. The business judgment rule is a de­
fense invoked to shield directors from personal liability for damages. The same principle 
of deference to directors may also be applied in a case seeking to enjoin board action to 
uphold the decision itself. The latter is sometimes referred to as "transactional justifica­
tion." Thus, the rule protects the decision maker, while the doctrine protects the deci­
sion. See, e.g., Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute's Corporate 
Gouernance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
609, 611-12, 6 1 8  (1984) [hereinafter cited as Hinsey]; Veasey & Seitz, supra note 106, at 
1487-88. This terminology is not, however, commonly employed by courts, and this arti­
cle will use the term "business judgment rule" as subsuming both aspects. 
'" See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y. 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 ( 1979)(doctrine bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors 
in good faith and honest judgment in legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes); Hin­
sey, supra note 108, at 612 (same); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Cri­
tique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 653, 664 (1984). 
110 See Arsht, supra note 107, at 95-97. A related concern is that imposing liability 
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and the fact that many business decisions involve an inherent 
element of risk-taking.111 The rule, however, is not unlimited. 
Directors may lose its benefit if they have a personal interest in 
the challenged transaction,112 fail to exercise due care,113 abu�e 
their discretion, 11• or act in bad faith.116 By the same token, m 
theory the business judgment rule need not be invoked at all 
unless a director cannot establish compliance with the standard 
of conduct prescribed by the duty of care.116 
The Model Act first codified the duty of care of directors in 
1974 by amending section 35; that amendment also incorporated 
on directors may in many instances visit them with a crushing financial burden com­
pletely out of proportion to any possible degree of culpability. See R. HAMILTON, CoRPO­
RATIONS 705 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing financial burden of directors in proportion to 
culpability). 
111 See Arsht, supra note 107, at 100. 
111 Id. et 115-18. 
111 Id. at 118-21; see Hinsey, supra note 108, at 615 (business judgment rule not 
applicable where director has made no actual decision). Thus it is commonly said that 
the business judgment rule has no application where directors have failed to act or to 
make en informed decision. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 
1984)(business judgment rule has no relevance to corporate decisionmaking until after 
decision has been made); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1944)(court.8 do not interfere with business judgment so long as reasonable diligence has 
been exercised); Arsht, supra note 107, at 119-20. 
114 Arsht, supra note 107, at 121-27. 
11• Id. at 127-30. See generally 3A W. FLECTHER, supra note 53, § 1040 (exemption 
of corporate officers from liability for mistakes and judgment errors only applies where 
there is exercise of skill, diligence, and care). 
1 1• E.g. , Section 8.30(d) of the RMA provides that " [a) director is not liable for any 
action taken as a director, or any failure to take any action, if he performed the duties of 
his office in compliance with this section." The comments elaborate on this point: 
Thus, both former section 35 and current section 8.30(d) are self-executing, 
and the individual director's exoneration from liability is automatic. If compli­
ance with the standard of conduct set forth in former section 35 or section 8.30 
is established, there is no need to consider possible application of the business 
judgment rule. The possible application of the business judgment rule need 
only be considered if compliance with the standard of conduct set forth in for­
mer section 35 or section 8.30 is not established. 
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Ac-r. § 8.30(d) official comment, at 224 (1984). 
The point to emphasize, then, is that the duty of care and business judgment rule 
are not the same. Courts often lack precision, however, in their discussions of these con­
cepts an� those of self-dealing. See, e.g., Home Tel. Co. v. Darley, 355 F. Supp. 992, 1000 
(N.D. Mi�. �973) (alt�ough �fficer not liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgment 
when acting in good faith, this does not excuse mistakes where loss is result of failure to 
exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence), aff'd per curiam, 489 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 
1974), discussed supra note 101. 
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a general statutory right of reliance on information furnished by 
specified sources.111 That provision was adopted in substance 
(but with some reorganization) by Section 8.30 of the RMA, the 
full text of which is as follows: 
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, includ­
ing his duties as a member of a committee: 
(1)  in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like po­
sition would exercise under similar circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on 
information, opinions, reports, or statements, including fi­
nancial statements and other financial data, if prepared or 
presented by: 
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation 
whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable 
1 17 See Report of Committee on Corporate Laws: Changes in the Model Business 
Corporation Act, 30 Bus. LAW. 501 (1975). The text of the relevant portion of section 35 
is as follows: 
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a 
member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good 
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi­
tion would use under similar circumstances. In performing his duties, a direc­
tor shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, 
including financial statements and other financial data, in each case prepared 
or presented by: 
(a) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the dir­
ector reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the mat­
ters presented, 
(b) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which the 
director reasonably believes to be within such person's professional 
or expert competence, or 
(c) a committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly desig­
nated in accordance with a provision of the articles of incorporation 
or the bylaws, as to matters within its designated authority, which 
committee the director reasonably believes to merit confidence, 
but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge 
concerning the matter in question that would cause such reliance to be 
unwarranted. 
MODEL BustNESS CoRP. Acr § 35 (1974). For a useful, practical interpretation of the 
meaning of section 35, see Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1600 
(1978). 
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and competent in the matters presented; 
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other pers?n� as to 
matters the director reasonably believes are w1thm the 
person's professional or expert competence; o� . 
(3) a committee of the board of directors of wh�ch he is 
not a member if the director reasonably believes the 
committee merits confidence. 
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has 
knowledge concerning the matter in question that 
makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection 
(b) unwarranted. 
( d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a di­
rector, or any failure to take any action, if he per­
formed the duties of his office in compliance with 
this section.118 
While at least thirty-two states have now codified the duty 
of care,11• there is no direct analogue to Section 8.30 in the 
MBCA. Section 91 of the MBCA imposes a statutory liability on 
directors who vote for or assent to improper dividends, share re­
purchases, distributions in liquidation, loans to insiders, or the 
commencement of business before the receipt of the minimum 
1 11 REVISED MODEL Busnass CoRP. AcT § 8.30 ( 1984). 
'" Au. CoDE 10-2A-74 (1980); CAL. CoRP. CooE § 309(a))(West 1 97 7 ) ;  CoLO. REV. 
STAT. § 7-5-101(2)(Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(d))(West Supp. 1986}; 
Fu. STAT. ANN. §  607.111(4))(West 1977); GA. CooE ANN. §§ 14-2-152 (1982); HAWAII REV. 
STAT. § 416-91.5(c)(Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-35 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1 -35· 
1 (Bums Supp. 1986); low A CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12.91 (West 1969); ME. REv. STAT ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1981); Mo. CoRP. & Ass'NS 
Coor: ANN. § 2.405.l(a)(3))(1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (West Supp. 1986); 
MICH. COMP LAWS ANN. § 450.1541(1))(1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985}; 
MoN'I'. CoDE ANN. § 35-1-401(2))(1985); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2035 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT./ ANN. § 14A:6-14 (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. 
LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1982); OHio REV. C onE ANN. § 
1701.59 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.34 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 57.228 
(1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon 1967); RI. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-33 ( 1 985);  S.C. 
CooE ANN. § 33-13-150 (Law. Co-op. 1977); TENN. CooE ANN. § 48-1-813 ( 1 984); VA. CoDE 
ANN. § 13.1 -690 (Repl. Vol. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.343 (Supp. 1986); 
Wvo. 
_
STAT. § 17-l-133(b) (Supp. 1985). The new Tennessee Business Corporation Act, 
effective October 1, 1987, adopts section 8.30 of the RMA without change. 1986 Tenn
. 
Pub. Acta ch. 887, § §  8.30, 17.08. 
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capital. 120 Also, it includes a limited right of reliance for the pur­
pose of determining liability under the section. 121 The MBCA 
does not otherwise speak to the issue of a standard of conduct 
for directors. The salient question, then, is whether it should. 
Few, if any, issues in the field of corporate law have been 
subject to more extensive recent debate than the appropriate 
standard of conduct for directors. In addition to the develop­
ment of the Model Act and RMA standards, the American Law 
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance Proj ect has dealt 
intensively with the issue,122 as has an immense body of schol­
arly literature. 1 23 Any attempt at an in-depth analysis of the is-
11• Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-91 (1972). 
12 1 Specifically, a director may rely upon: 
[F] inancial statements of the corporation represented to him to be correct by 
the president or the officer of such corporation having charge of its books of 
account, or stated in a written report by an independent public or certified 
public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial con­
dition of such corporation . . . .  
Id. He is likewise shielded from liability if "in good faith in determining the amount 
available for any such dividend or distribution he considered the assets to be of their 
book value." Id. 
122 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. 
Draft No. 4, 1 985) [hereinafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 4] . 
m See, e.g., Andrews, Corporate Governance Eludes the Legal Mind, 37 U. MIAMI 
L. REv. 213 (1983); Arsht, supra note 107; Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same 
Harbor but Charted Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW. 947 (1980); Brudney, The Role 
of the Board of Directors: The ALI and Its Critics, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 223 (1983); 
Christy, Corporate Mismanagement as Malpractice: A Critical Reanalysis of Corporate 
Managers ' Duties of Care and Loyalty, 2 1  Hous. L. REv. 105 (1984); Coffee, Regulating 
the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in 
Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 145 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Coffee]; 
Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Stands and Sane· 
tions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEx. L. REV. 591 (1983); Dent, The 
Revolution in Corporate Governance, the Monitoring Board, and the Director's Duty of 
Care, 61 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1981); Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An 
Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 187 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate Governance 
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259 (1982); Frankel, Corporate Directors' Duty of Care: 
The American Law Institute's Project on Corporate Governance, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
705 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Frankel]; Goldstein, Future Articulation of Corporate 
Law, 39 Bus. LAW. 1541 (1984); Hinsey, supra note 108; Kennedy, The Standard of Re­
sponsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 624 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Ken· 
nedy]; Knauss, Corporate Governance - A Mouing Target, 79 MICH. L. REV. 478 (1981); 
Letts, Corporate Governance: A Different Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505 (1980); Mace, Direc· 
tors: Myth and Reality - Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979); Mangrum, In 
Search of a Paradigm of Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 21 
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sue is beyond the scope of this article. Some general observa­
tions, however, should be made. 
Foremost among these is that there is obviously no consen­
sus whatsoever as to the appropriate standard of care, whether 
existing formulations are too lax or too demanding, or indeed 
whether it is feasible to codify the duty of care at all. Even the 
drafters of the RMA have been inconsistent in their approach; 
the original version of section 8.30 attempted not only to state 
the duty of care but also to codify the business judgment rule. 12' 
(1983-84); Manning, The Business Judgement Rule and the Director's Duty of Atten· 
tion: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 ( 1984); Manning, The Business Judgment 
Rule in Overview, 145 OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984); Phillips, Principles of Corporate Govern· 
ance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 653 (1984); Ruder, Protections for 
Corporate Shareholders: Are Major Revisions Needed?, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 243 ( 1983); 
Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 
35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983); Steinberg, The American Law lnstitute's Draft Restate· 
ment on Corporate Governance: The Business Judgment Rule, Related Principles, and 
Some General Observations, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 ( 1983); Veasey, New Insights into 
Judicial Deference to Di,.ectors' Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 
Bus. LAW. 1461 (1984); Veasey & Manning, supra note 105; Williamson, Corporate Gov· 
ernance, 93 YALE L.J. 105 (1984). 
, .. 1983 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.30 (Exposure Draft March, 1983). 
The 1983 Draft provides: 
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a 
member of a committee: 
(1)  in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances; and 
(3) When exercising his business judgment, with the belief, premised on 
a rational basis, that his decision is in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
(b) In . d.iacharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other 
financial data, if prepared or presented by: 
(1)  one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the direc­
tor reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters 
presented; 
(2) l�gal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the 
director reasonably believes are within the person's professional or 
expert competence; or 
(3) a committee of the board of which he is not a member as to matters 
within its jurisdiction, if the director reasonably beli�ves the com­
mittee merits confidence. 
(c) A direc�or is no.t acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the 
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection 
(b) unwarranted. 
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This latter effort was abandoned in the final version of section 
8.30. 1211 
Id. 
(d) Subject to compliance with section 8.31 if a director has an interest in a 
transaction: 
( l )  the director is not liable for the performance of the duties of his 
office if he acted in compliance with this section; and 
(2) a person alleging a violation of this section has the burden of prov­
ing the violation. 
(e) Subject to compliance with other provisions of this Act and other applica­
ble law, a proceeding to enjoin, modify, rescind, or reverse a business deci­
sion, based on an alleged violation of this section, may not prevail if the 
directors who made the decision discharged their duties in compliance 
with this section. 
1 11 The explanation for the change is that extensive adverse comments were received 
to the proposed section; in light of these, the drafters concluded that the issues involved 
were too complex to resolve at that time and returned to the more traditional formula­
tion finally adopted. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 933 (3d ed. 1985); Goldstein, 
supra note 8, at 1475. 
This criticism has not deterred the American Law Institute; Section 4.01 of the pro­
posed Principles of Corporate Governance embraces both concepts: 
(a) A director or officer has a duty to his corporation to perform his functions 
in good faith, in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent 
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and 
under similar circumstances. 
(1)  This duty includes the obligation to make, or cause to be made, such 
inquiry as the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropri­
ate under the circumstances. 
(2) In performing any of his functions (including his oversight func­
tions), a director or officer is entitled to rely on materials and per­
sons in accordance with § §  4.02-.03. 
(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute or by a standard of the corpora­
tion and subject to the board's ultimate responsibility for oversight, in 
performing its functions (including oversight functions), the board may 
delegate, formally or informally by course of conduct, any function (in" 
eluding the function of identifying matters requiring the attention of the 
board) to committees of the board or to directors, officers, employees, ex­
perts, or other persons; a director may rely on such committees and per­
sons in fulfilling his duty under this Section with respect to any delegated 
function if his reliance is in accordance with §§ 4.02-.03. 
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills 
his duty under this Section if: 
(1) he is not interested in the subject of his business judgment; 
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment 
to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the cir: 
cumstances; and 
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best inter-
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The Model Act (and RMA) standard has been criticized on 
various grounds. Some argue that the inclusion of the "reasona­
ble belief' test may tend to undercut the good faith standard of 
the business judgment rule and expand the scope of judicial re­
view of decisions which would otherwise not be subject to at­
tack.126 Others suggest that, due to its different variables, it is 
difficult to construct, apply, and understand.127 Interestingly, in 
drafting the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act, the Virginia 
Code Commission concluded that RMA Section 8.30 could hold 
directors to an unrealistically high standard.128 Virginia, how­
ever, apparently has adopted a standard that requires only good 
faith, thereby foreclosing any inquiry into a director's compe­
tence.129 Certainly the high cost and, indeed, increasing unavail­
ability of directors' and officers' insurance has created very legit­
imate concerns on the part of corporate management as to its 
potential liability. The Virginia Legislature was, no doubt, moti-
ests of the corporation. 
Tent. Draft No. 4, supra note 122, § 4.01. So long as a business decision is made on an 
informed basis, then, it is reviewed not against the "reasonable man" standard generally 
applicable but against the more lenient business judgment rule. Murphy, The New Vir­
ginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 67, 106 n.1 1 1  (1985) [her
ein­
after cited as Murphy]. Extensive commentary on the ALI standard can b e  found in 
Frankel, supra note 123; Hinsey, supra note 108; Kennedy, supra note 123; Phillips, 
supra note 123. 
, .. See, e.g., Veasey & Manning, supra note 105 at 930-42. 
m M h 
' 
urp y, supra note 125, at 105-06. The author suggests the following methodol-
ogy for applying the Model Act test: 
Application of this standard requires the trier of fact first to construct a 







and .its role in corporate decision making (the "in like position and m similar circumstances" elements). Next, what the ordinarily 
prudent perso�, as �easured against that factual background, would do with 
respect t? th� issue m question must be determined. Finally, the trier of fact 
must decide 1f the conduct or ct' f th d'  · · · . a ion o e uectors m question was consistent with the reasonable man standard. 
Id. at 105. 
ltl v A. CODE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 OF TITLE 13.l 






d, th� new Virginia statute requires a director to act "in accordance 
with his good faith business judgment of the best intere ts f th t' " VA CoDE 
ANN § 13.l-690(A)(re l vol . . . 
s o e corpora ion. . 
d. d th v· 
. . P · · 1985). By ehmmatmg any semblance of a reasonable man 
stan ar , e 1rgm1a Act may reduc th d t f · · 
· 
· h d. t , . 
e e u Y o care to a purely subjective mqmry 
mto t � irec or 8 good fait
�
. In so doing the statute may invite protection for "the utterly mept, but well-meanmg, good faith director " M h te 125 t 108 . urp y, supra no , a · 
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vated in part by those concerns in its actions. On the other 
hand, it is disingenuous to ignore the revenue-enhan cing poten­
tial of provisions which, understandably, are appealing to corpo­
rate managers and promoters. 130 While certainly any corporate 
legislation enacted in Mississippi should create as favorable a 
climate for business as reasonably practicable, one must balance 
against this the possible prejudice to shareholders from the 
adoption o f  an overly lax standard. 
The burgeoning case law involving hostile takeover bids and 
the permissible range of conduct by mangement in r esponding to 
them has brought into focus issues involving the duty of care 
and the business judgment rule with an intensity never before 
expierenced in American corporate law. 131 Moreover, suggestions 
"0 The Virginia Act contains other models on this point. In addition to possibly 
eliminating a meani ngful duty of care, it includes a separate set of provisions dealing 
with "affiliated transactions" between a corporation and a potentially dominant share­
holder. See VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -728 (repl. vol. 1985). The clear thrust of these 
provisions is to discourage hostile takeover attempts, although the statute is admittedly 
more broadly drawn. See Murphy, supra note 1 25, at 124-27 (general discussion of provi­
sions dealing with transactions between corporations and potentially dominant 
shareholders). 
131 See, e.g. , Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 
1986); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart Indus. v. 
Smith Int'!, Inc.,  741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 
F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983); Mobile Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); 
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 2 7 1  (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 
(1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. 
v. Inter North Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 
621 F. Supp. 1 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 
623 (D. Md. 1982); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 
(Del. 1986); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 490 A.2d 
1059 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1 985); Veasey & Seitz, supra note 106, at 1489-
93. For background on the various defense mechanisms utilized to combat hostile take­
overs see A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING (1981); M. 
LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS (1978); Black & Smith, Antitake­
over Charter Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEB L. 
REv. 699 (1979); Friedenberg, Jaws III: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellant Amend· 
ments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 32 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Ap· 
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defense Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. 
REv. 819 (1981 ) ;  Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's 
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1982); Comment, Delaware's 
Attempt to Swallow a New Takeover Defense: The Poison Pill Preferred Stock, 10 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 569 ( 1 985); Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative under Section 
14(e) , 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 228 (1984); Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and 
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that the protections of the business judgment rule have limited 
the duty of care to an aspirational function, 132 or that the
. 
duty 
of care is "dead,"133 have been largely put to rest by Smith v. 
Van Gorkom1a. (the "Trans Unio n "  case), in which the Dela­
ware Supreme Court held that the board of directors of Tr�ns 
Union Corporation was guilty of "gross negligence" in evaluatmg 
and recommending to the shareholders for approval a merger 
proposal.1311 The court imposed liability on them for the diffe�­
ence between the price paid by the purchaser and the "fair 
value" of the corporation's stock as of the date of the merger.136 
Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1964 ( 1984);  Note, 
Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 62l 
(1983). 
111 See Hinsey, supra note 108, at 614-15. 
m See Frankel, supra note 123, at 715-16. 
m 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) . 
m Id. at 881. 
1" Id. at 893. It is difficult to impart the full flavor of Van Gorkom without a de­
tailed reading of the rather lengthy opinion. Essentially, Van Gorkom, Trans Union's 
chairman, formulated a plan to sell the corporation for $55 a share in a leveraged buy­
out and presented the plan to industrialist Jay Pritzker of Chicago. Although the corpo­
ration's chief financial officer had suggested that a feasible range for such a transaction 
was $50 to $60 per share, no extensive study on that question was undertaken; rather 
Van Gorkom seized upon the $55 figure as a price for which he would be willing to sell 
his 75,000 shares. Immediately before the merger was announced, the stock was selling at 
a high of $38.25 and a low of $29.50. The negotiations between Van Gorkom and Pritzker 
were private and not specifically authorized by the board; no price negotiations took 
place. When Pritzker presented a merger offer with a three day deadline, Van Gorkom 
called a board meeting for the next day; the notice did not disclose the purpose of the 
meeting. At the meeting, Van Gorkom made a twenty minute presentation concerning 
the proposal; he did not disclose the methodology by which he had arrived at the $55 
price or that he proposed that price to Pritzker. The only other matters of substance 
presented to the board were (1) its attorney's advice that a fairness opinion was not 
required as a matter of law; (2) the chief financial officer's statement that $55 was in the 
ran�e of a f�ir price; and (3) a supporting statement by the corporation's president. The 
entire meetmg lasted abut two hours; the result was board approval of the merger agree­
ment, which at that time (and indeed as of its execution) had not been read by any 
member of the board, including Van Gorkom. Id. at 866-69. 
The court held that the directors (five inside and five outside) breached their "fidu­
ciary duty" to shareholders by "their failure to inform themselves of all information rea­
sonably available to them and relevant to their decision to recommend the Pritzker 
merger," thus denying them the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at 893. The 
case was thereafter settled for $23,500,000. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 679 (3d ed. 
1986). 
Pre�i�tably, Van Gor�om has attracted a firestorm of controversy and commentary 
(both critical and supportive). See, e.g., Chittur, supra note 105; Fischel, The Business 
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Clearly, then, this is an area of the law currently m a state of 
substantial ferment. 
The fact that corporate law nationally is in a period of rapid 
change on these issues, coupled with the paucity of authority in 
Mississippi, leads to the conclusion that codification of the duty 
of care may be premature in this state. This is based on two 
Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) (describing 
Van Gorkom as "one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law") [hereinafter 
cited as Fischel, Trans Union) ;  Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the 
Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985); Moskin, Trans Union: A Nailed 
Board, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 ( 1985); Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to 
"Henny Penny" and Her Friends, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (1985); Quillen, Trans Union, 
Business Judgment and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465 (1985); Schwartz & 
Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" nor "Bad" Law, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 429 (1985); 
Veasey & Seitz, supra note 106, at 1497-1503; Comment, Mining the Safe Harbor? The 
Business Judgment Rule After Trans Union, 10 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 545 ( 1985); Baldo, Dela· 
ware Rocks the Boat, FORBES, April 8, 1985, at 126; Bordon, First Thoughts on Decision 
in Delaware on Trans Union, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3. The ultimate impact of 
the decision is, of course, unclear. Some see it as part of a continuing attempt by the 
Delaware Supreme Court to respond to those who criticize Delaware's corporate statutes 
as inadequately protecting the rights of shareholders, particularly those in the minority. 
See, e.g. , Fischel, Trans Union, supra, at 1 454; Fischel, Reflections, supra note 14, at 923 
(in recent decisions Delaware Supreme Court has limited discretion of managers and 
controlling sharehlders while increasing power of minority shareholders); see also supra 
note 14 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of "liberal" statutes). On the other 
hand, the Delaware court has certainly proven itself to be capable of mercurial conduct 
in this regard. E.g., compare Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977)(hold­
ing that controlling shareholders in "freezeout" merger must show legitimate business 
interest for merger other than sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders) with 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983)(overruled business purpose 
test, substituted "intrinsic fairness" test and expanded appraisal valuation; thus absent 
egregious misconduct on part of controlling shareholders, minority's only remedy is ap­
praisal); see Berger & Allingham, A New Light on Cash-Out Mergers: Weinberger 
Eclipses Singer, 39  Bus. LAW. 1 (1983); Note, Freezeouts Under the 1983 Illinois Busi· 
ness Corporation Act: The Need for Protection of Minority Shareholders from "Going 
Private" Mergers, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 679, 688-693 (1985). In any event, Trans Union 
demonstrates that the duty of care is not rendered an empty threat by the shield of the 
business judgment rule. 
For another well-known (although arguably less dramatic) recent case imposing sub­
stantial liability for director misconduct see Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 
432 A.2d 814 ( 1981), holding the estate of the widow of a reinsurance corporation's prin· 
cipal owner liable for over $10,000,000 in funds which her two sons, the other directors of 
the corporation, siphoned off in the form of bogus loans. Id. at 825-26. The court im· 
posed liability on the basis of her negligence in failing entirely to undertake any effort 
whatsoever to acquaint herself with the affairs of the corporation. Id. Of course, because 
of her total lack of any action, the business judgment rule had no application to the 
claim. See supra note 113. 
202 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL 
[VOL. 56 
premises: first, that codification is not inherently superior to 
common law determinations of these issues; and second, that 
any statute adopted dealing with such currently controver�ial 
questions may not be determinative in the way courts decide 
cases.137 The risk that a standard either unreasonably high or 
undesirably lax might be enacted may be too great until the pre­
sent flux in decisional law is resolved. 
Significantly, Illinois, which revised its business corporation 
act in 1983, incorporated much of the Exposure Draft of the 
RMA but deleted section 8.30 or any other codification of the 
duty of care. 138 It is recommended that Mississippi do likewise, 
with one exception. The express reliance provisions of Section 
8.30 of the RMA 139 are reasonable and provide a desirable safe 
harbor for directors acting in good faith. It is suggested, how­
ever, that no other attempt to define the appropriate standard 
of conduct for directors should be made at this time. This ap­
proch would be consistent with that of Delaware, which provides 
for a right of reliance but which otherwise does not codify the 
duty of care.140 
2. Duty of Loyalty. 
Directors, as fiduciaries, owe a duty of undivided loyalty 
and utmost good faith to their corporations. 1•1 Broadly read, this 
"' See V�asey & S�itz, supra note 106, at 1505. For example, a court may in effect 
exonerate a duector acting in good faith regardless of the language of a statute. 
u• See generally ILLINOIS BUSINESS CORP. ACT OF 1983, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § §  
l .O l - l 7 .05 (Supp. 1983). Interestingly, Illinois adopted without substantial amendment 
the Exposure Draft provision on conflicts of interest. Compare id. § 8.60 with REVISED 
Mo.DEL Bu�.INEss.CoRP. Aci: § �.31 (Exposure Draft March, 1983)(comparison of "conflic
t 
of 1�terest sectJO�s of Ilhno1s Business Corporation Act of 1983 and Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act). 
... REVISED MODEL B c . te 117  
USINESs ORP. Ac-r § 8.30(b), (c)(1984); see supra text accom pa-
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duty restricts directors from competing with their corpora­
tions; 142 a more particularized application is the avoidance of 
transactions that involve conflicts of interest. 143 
The common law rule of automatic voidability of such 
transactions has long since been abandoned by most courts. 144 
The modern approach by courts has been to emphasize the ele­
ments of fairness and disclosure; in many instances, ratification 
by a disinterested board of directors has the effect of shifting 
the burden of proving lack of fairness to the p arty challenging 
the transaction. 1411 Nonetheless, lack of uniformity on the part of 
courts considering the issue has been the rule. 148 
Due in part to the lack of certainty engendered by the juris­
prudence on the subject, the recent trend has been to enact stat­
utory provisions dealing with conflicts of interest. The first state 
to do so was California; the Model Act added a similar provision 
ior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when peti­
tioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating ero­
sion" of particular exceptions. 
Id. at 463-64, 164 N.E. at 546. 
••• HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 236, at 628. The Mississippi Constitution 
and MBCA reflect this prohibition by requiring stockholder consent for a person who is 
"engaged or interested in a competing business either individually or as employee or 
stockholder" to be elected to the board of directors. Miss. CONST. art. 7, § 194; Miss. 
CoDE ANN. § 79-3-67 (1972). As a practical matter, of course, this mandates disclosure 
and express stockholder approval. This is contrary to the common law rule, at least in 
the absence of detriment to the corporation. 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 856. 
10 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 913; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238. 
1•• See, e.g., 3 W. FLETCHER, supra note 53, § 917; Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? 
Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 39 ( 1966) [hereinafter 
cited as Marsh). 
m See HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 638-40; Marsh, supra note 144; 
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2 at 388-89. 
ue E.g., courts have differed on the following issues; (1) whether the interested di­
rector can be counted in determining the presence of a quorum of the board; (2) whether 
the vote of an interested director could be counted; and (3) whether a conflict of interest 
transaction was voidable on the basis of the conflict alone, on the basis of the conflict 
plus an element of bad faith or fraud, or on the basis of the conflict plus a showing of 
unfairness to the corporation. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 639-40. Most 
courts appear to concede that ratification by shareholders will validate the transaction, 
in the absence of fraud or unfairness; again, however, there is conflicting authority as to 
whether the vote of the interested director as a shareholder can be counted, although the 
majority answer seems to be affirmative. Marsh, supra note 143, at 48-49 & nn.50-51. 
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in 1966.1·" Currently at least thirty-eight states have adopted 
such statutes. 1"8 
The RMA carries forward the approach taken by former 
Model Act Section 41. Section 8.31 of the RMA provides in per­
tinent part: 
(a) A conflict of interest transaction is a transactio n  with 
the corporation in which a director of the corporation has a 
direct or indirect interest. A conflict of interest transaction is 
not voidable by the corporation solely because of the director's 
interest in the transaction if any one of the following is true: 
(1) The material facts of the transaction and the direc­
tor's interest were disclosed or known to the board of direc­
tors or a committee of the board of d irectors and the board 
of directors or committee authorized, approved, or ratified 
the transaction; 
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's 
interest were disclosed or known to the shareholders enti­
tled to vote and they authorized, approved, or ratified the 
' "  HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 238, at 640 n.10. 
••• See ALA. CooE § 10-2A-63 (1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-041 (1977); CAL. 
CollP. CooE § 310 (WEST 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-5-114.5 (Supp. 1985); CoNN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN § 33-323 ( West Supp. 1986); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 ( 1983); FLA. STATB 
ANN. § 607 . 124 (West 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-155 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-41 
(1980); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, , 8.60 (1985); IND. STAT. ANN. § 23-1 -35-2 (Supp. 1986); 
lowA CODE ANN. § 496A.34 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6304 (1981); Kv. 
Rzv . STAT. ANN. § 271A.205 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.84 (West 1969); MB. 
Rn STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (1981); Mo. CORPS & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-419 (1985); 
M1cH. CowP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1545 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.255 (West 
1985); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 351 .327 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-413 
0985); Nu Rav. STAT. § 21-2040.01 (1983); NEv . REv. STAT. § 78.140 (1985); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 293-A:41 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. A N N. § 14A:6-8 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. 
Bus. CollP. LAW, § 7 1 3  (McKinney 1986); N .C. GEN. STAT., § 55-30 (1982); OHIO R.Ev. CODE 
ANN. § 1701.60 (Page 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1 .175a (West 1986); OR. RBv. 
STAT. § 57.265 ( 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1986); RI. GEN. 
LAWS § 7-1 1-37.l ( 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-160 (Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 
48·1-816 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 1 ,  § 1888 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (repl. vol. 
1985); W. VA. CooE § 31-1 -25 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.355 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo. 
SnT § 17- 1 -136.1 (Supp. 1985). 
The Indiana and Virginia statutes cited above and the new Tennessee Business Cor­
poration Act, effective 1987, have adopted section 8.31 without substantial change. See 
1986 Tenn. Pub. Acta 887, § 8.31. For a discussion of the different approaches taken by 
variou1 •tatea aee 2 REVISED MooEL BUSINESS CORP. A<::r. ANN. 968-70 (3d ed. 1985); 
Note, DirtC'tor Conflict of Interest under the 1983 B.C.A.; A Standard of Fairness, 1985 
U ILL L Ra:v. 74 1 ,  743 n.12 (198!>) (hereinafter cited as Note, Fairness] .  
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transaction; or 
(3) the transaction was fair to the corporation. 1411 
Presumably few corporate practitioners in Mississippi would 
question the desirability of a statutory standard in this state. 
The confusion engendered by the leading Mississippi case, Knox 
Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 150 has received extensive com­
ment previously in this Journaz,m and those discussions need 
not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that the opinion 
raises several troublesome questions: e.g. , whether ratification by 
disinterested directors is essentially irrelevant to the issue of the 
voidability vel non of a conflict of interest transaction;1112 
whether the mere fact that an interested director represents 
,., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.3l(a)(l984). The text of former section 
41 is as follows: 
No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of 
its directors or any other corporation, firm, association or entity in which one 
or more of its directors are directors or officers or are financially interested, 
shall be either void or voidable because of such relationship or interest or be· 
cause such director or directors are present at the meeting of the board of 
directors or a committee thereof which authorizes, approves or ratifies such 
contract or transaction or because his or their votes are counted for such pur­
pose, if: 
(a) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known to the 
board of directors or committee which authorizes, approves or ratifies the con· 
tract or transaction by a vote or consent sufficient for the purpose without 
counting the votes or consents of such interested directors; or 
(b) the fact of such relationship or interest is disclosed or known tQ the 
shareholders entitled to vote and they authorize, approve or ratify such con­
tract or transaction by vote or written consent; or 
(c) the contract or·transaction is fair and reasonable to the corporation. 
Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the pres· 
ence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or a committee thereof 
which authorizes, approves or ratifies such contract or transaction. 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr. § 41 (1969). It should be noted that section 41 speaks in 
terms of disclosure of the "relationship or interest" of the director, while section 8.31 
requires disclosure of the material facts of the transaction as well as the director's inter· 
est. As to the possible significance of this distinction see infra note 156. 
160 228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956), suggestion of error overruled per curiam, 
228 Miss. 699, 91  So. 2d 843, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 977 (1957). 111 See generally Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 386-90 (discussion of director 
conflict of  interest); Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 889-95 . 
... See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 388 (discussion of Knox Glass). But cf. 
Comment, Transactions, supra note 11,  at 894 (noting language in opinion that indicates 
that disclosure to and approval by disinterested majority of directors would validate 
transaction). 
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both himself and the corporation in the transaction renders it 
automatically voidable without regard to fairness;163 and 
whether ratification by shareholders validates a transaction even 




this is needed. It is debatable, however, whether that direction is 
adequately provided by the RMA. 
It has been noted that existing conflict of interest statutes 
are generally narrow in scope,11111 and RMA Section 8.31 follows 
this pattern. The fundamental question, however, is precisely 
what it seeks to accomplish: does it state a rule by which a 
transaction can be validated for all purposes, or does it merely 
save a conflict of interest transaction from automatic voidability 
if the prescribed procedures are followed? Section 41 of the 
Model Act, and most existing state statutes, were ambiguous on 
this issue, and the RMA unfortunately carries forward this am­
biguity. Arguably, the disjunctive nature of the statute suggests 
that either ratification by disinterested directors or ratification 
by disinterested shareholders or a showing of fairness will vali­
date a transaction. Thus, in theory, an unfair transaction might 
be saved if proper ratification were effected. 
The leading cases interpreting statutes similar to the Model 
Act have, admittedly, rejected this construction and held that 
ratification does not preclude judicial inquiry into the question 
of fairness.1" This view, in turn, poses the question of what is 
'" See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 388 (discussion of Knox Glass); Comment, 
Transactions, supra note 11, at 894 (comparison of Model Act with Mississippi rule in 
Knox Glass). Indeed, the very sense in which the court used the term "representation" is 
unclear. 
, .. Comment, Transactions, supra note 11,  at 894. 
'" They do not address the types of transactions to which they are directed; do not 
refer to differing aspects of the duty of loyalty, such as competition with the corporation, 
corporate o?portunitiee, or the use of corpora.tP. property, information or resources for 
personal gain; and do not extend to officers or major shareholders, or to those having 
close association with directors, officers, and major shareholders. Sommer, The Duty of 
Loyalty in the ALi's Corporate Gouernance Project , 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719, 722 
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Sommer] .  
, .. See, e.g., Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 
241 P.2d 66, 86 0952)(held directors in violation of fiduciary duty by entering contract 
on behalf of corporation); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 224-25 (Del. 1976)(direc­
to� �ust show fairness of transaction). In addition, most commentators have supported thui view, although there is some opinion to the contrary. See Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 14, at 207 nn. 47-48 (discussion of Remillard Brick). Perhaps the leading advocate 
1986] CORPORA TE LA W REFORM 
the effect of ratification. While many courts have held that it 
has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to those attacking 
the transaction, others have held that it simply lowers the stan­
dard of proof of fairness or that the burden remains on the di­
rector in all events. 1117 The drafters of the Model Act were some­
what vague on the effect of section 41, stating only that its 
purpose was "not to provide a basis for validating for all pur­
poses a contract or transaction . . . but simply to establish that 
such contract or transaction is  not automatically void or voida­
ble solely by reason of the director's interest. "168 No mention 
was made of burden of proof. Similarly, the comments to RMA 
Section 8.31 provide only that " [t]he sole purpose of section 8.31 
is to sharply limit the common law principle of automatic 
voidability. "169 There is likewise no reference to burden of proof. 
Given the significance of the question and the confusion 
that continues to cloud this area under current statutes, it seems 
of the latter position was Professor Ernest Folk, who argued that since the Delaware 
statute requires disclosure not only of the director's interest but of the material facts of 
the transaction, the purpose of the statute was to validate the transaction if any of the 
statutory tests were met. Thus, full disclosure would remove the question of fairness 
from court scrutiny so long as the requirement of approval by directors or stockholders 
was met. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 
75-88 ( 1972). The effect would be to substitute full disclosure for fairness. Bulbulia & 
Pinto, supra note 14, at 213. However, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Folk's posi­
tion. Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 224-25 (Del. 1976). Section 8.31 of the RMA, 
like Delaware but unlike Section 41 of the Model Act, requires disclosure of both the 
interest and material facts of the transaction. See supra note 149 and accompanying 
text. 
117 See Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 888 nn. 65-69 (discussion of bur­
den of proof of interested directors). 
11• 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 41, at 844 (2d ed. 1971). This avowal was 
somewhat undercut, however, by another statem.ent that the section "validates, if the 
prescribed tests are satisfied, transactions with interested directors which common law 
rules often make voidable, if not void." Id. at 842 (emphasis added). 
m REVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CORP. AC'f § 8.31 official comment (1984). The com-
ments are somewhat more detailed on the question of validation, stating that: 
[T)he elimination of the automatic rule of voidability does not mean that all 
transactions that meet one or more of the tests set forth in section 8.3l(a) are 
automatically valid. These transactions may be subject to attack on a variety 
of grounds independent of section 8.31-for example, that the transaction con­
stituted waste, that it was not authorized by the appropriate corporate body, 
that it violated other sections of the [RMA], or that it was unenforceable 
under other common law principles. 
Id. 
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clear that any conflict of interest statute that Mississippi ad
opts 
should state explicitly its purpose; or, whether it provides a pro­
cedure for absolute validation or whether it is merely a savings 
provision with procedural implications that retains fairness as 
the ultimate test of validity. Some recent statutes appear to take 
the former approach,180 and arguments have been advanced that 
Mississippi should do so.181 With deference, I disagre e  and be­
lieve that Mississippi should take the latter course. 
The Exposure Draft of the RMA made it plain that the 
Draft was a savings provision and that ratification operated only 
to shift the burden of proof from the director to the person at­
tacking the transaction.182 This approach was ultimately aban-
"0 The present California statute appears to validate for all purposes transactio
ns 
ratified by disinterested shareholders without regard to fairness. See CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 
310 & legislative committee comment (West 1977); Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 14, at 
218-23. 
111 See Comment, Transactions, supra note 11, at 899-900 (proposed absolute vali­
dation for Mississippi). 
111 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 8.31 (Exposure Draft March, 1983): 
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, 
approved, or ratified, the fact that a director or officer of the corporation has a 
direct or indirect interest in the transaction is not a ground for invalidating the 
transaction or for imposing liability on that director or officer. 
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction in which a 
director or officer has an interest, the person asserting validity has the burden 
of proving fairness unless: 
(1) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or of­
ficer's interest were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a com­
mi�tee of the board and the board or committee authorized, approved, or 
ratified �he tran�ction by the vote of a requisite quorum of directors who 
had no interest m the transaction; or 
(2) the material facts of the transaction and the director's or of· 
ficer's interest were disclosed to the shareholders entitled to vote and they 
authorized, approved, or ratified the transaction by the vote of a requisite 
quorum of shareholders who had no interest in the transaction. 
(c) Th� presen�e of, or votes entitled to be cast by, the director or officer 
who �� a duect or indirect interest in the transaction may be counted in de­
termmmg �hether a quorum is present but may not be counted when the 
board 0� directors, a committee of the board, or the shareholders vote on the 
transaction . 
. (d) For purposes of this section, a director or officer has an indirect inter-est m a transaction if an ent't 
· h" h h h . . . . . . 1 Y m w 1c e as a material financial mterest or m which he 1s an officer d" to 1 . 
. 
• 1rec r, or genera partner 1s a party to the transac-
tion. A vote or consent of th t t"t 
· d . a en 1 Y 1s eemed to be a vote or consent of the director or officer for purposes of subsection (c). 
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cloned, however, and the drafters of the RMA returned to a 
more traditional approach. 183 Significantly, Professor Robert 
Hamilton, Reporter for the RMA, has expressed his strong disa­
greement with the decision of the Committee, 184 and one major 
state, Illinois, has adopted the substance of the Exposure Draft 
in its new business corporation act. 14111 
I believe that the Illinois approach is sound and should be 
followed i n  Mississippi. To be sure, the attractions of a validat-
Id. Moreover, the proposed comments to the Draft stated that " Section 8.31 validates 
only fair transactions and allocates the burden of proof on the issue of fairness." This 
was said to "follow the judicial construction placed on earlier versions of the Model Act 
dealing with the subject of self-dealing transactions." Id. official comment. 11• The only official explanation for the change was that "adverse comments" were 
received on the proposed section. 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 966 (3d 
ed. 1985); see Goldstein, supra note 8, at 1475-76 (explaining changes in two versions). 
, .. Hamilton, supra note 8, at 1455, 1463, 1468 n.35 
m ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 11 8.60 ( 1 985): 
11 8.60 Director conflict of interest. 
(a) If a transaction is fair to a corporation at the time it is authorized, 
approved, or ratified, the fact that a director of the corporation is directly or 
indirectly a party to the transaction is not grounds for invalidating the 
transaction. 
(b) In a proceeding contesting the validity of a transaction described in 
subsection (a), the person asserting validity has the burden of proving fairness 
unless: 
(1)  The material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or 
relationship were disclosed or known to the board of directors or a committee 
of the board and the board or committee authorized, approved or ratified the 
transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of disinterested directors, 
even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or 
(2) The material facts of the transaction and the director's interest or 
relationship were disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote and 
they authorized, approved or ratified the transaction without counting the vote 
of any shareholder who is an interested director. 
The presence of the director, who is directly or indirectly a party to the 
transaction described in subsection ( 1), or a director who is otherwise not dis­
interested, may be counted in determining whether a quorum is present but 
may not be counted when the board of directors or a committee of the board 
takes action on the transaction. 
For purposes of this Section, a director is "indirectly" a party to a transac­
tion if the other party to the transaction is an entity in which the director has 
a material financial interest or of which the director is an officer, director or 
general partner. 
Id. Unlike the Exposure Draft, Illinois (like most states) continues to limit its conflict of 
interest rules to directors, not nondirector officers. See supra note 162. For an analysis of 
the Illinois statute see Note, Fairness, supra note 148. 
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ing statute (particularly to corporate counsel) are obvious: it 
provides a substantial measure of predictability, and would seem 
to provide a far surer basis for an opinion on the enforceability 
of an interested party transaction. This, however, may be some­
what illusory; even validating statutes customarily require that 
ratification be made "in good faith,"166 a notoriously elusive con­
cept. Fundamentally, however, the potential for abuse militates 
against the adoption of a validating statute, o r  even one (like the 
present RMA) that could conceivably be so construed.167 Ratifi­
cation by directors, even if technically disinterested, may be 
tainted by their association with the interested director. Particu­
larly if the interested director is a dominant member of the 
board, it may be disingenuous to believe that his colleagues 
could exercise independent judgment. 
While shareholder ratification might, on the surface, provide 
a more substantial basis for validation, this likewise may be 
more apparent than real. The ease with which shareholder votes 
can be manipulated in public corporations is well known to any­
one with experience in that type of representation. Moreover, 
the argument that any infirmity in the vote can be adequately 
avoided by preventing the interested director's shares from be­
ing counted towards a quorum or in the vote is too simplistic. 
168 
Section 8.31 of the RMA does not deal adequately with this 
problem. While the provision disqualifies the interested director 
from voting, it provides that a majority of the remaining shares 
constitutes a quorum for purposes of ratification, and a majority 
119 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310(a)(1977). 
187 Notwithstanding the substantial authority to the contrary and the avowals in th
e 
commentary to the RMA, the possibility of such a construction of § 8.31 should not be 
discounted. For example, the new Virginia Act adopts § 8.31 without substantial change. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691 (repl. vol. 1985). The Joint Bar Committee appointed to stu�Y 
the draft statute stated in its commentary that while " [s]ome courts have read the fair­
ness element into the disclosure and voting sections . . .  [t]his section does not ado
pt 
this approach." VA. CODE CoMM'N REPORT ON THE REVISION OF CHAPTERS 1 AND 2 or 1'.ITLE 13.l OP THE CooE
, 
or VIRGINIA, H. Doc. No. 13, App. 4, at 251 (1985) [hereinafte� 
cited as VA. CODE COMM N REPORT] . For an argument that the new Virginia Act does no 
depart from prevailing interpretations of prior law despite the uncertainty caused by th
e 
traditional formulation, see Murphy, supra note 125, at 1 11-12. 
, .. Se
.
e Comment: Transactions, supra note 11, at 899-900 (proposed pre
venting 
shares of mterested duectors from being counted). 
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vote of those shares will be sufficient to constitute ratification. 169 
The result may be ratification by the majority of a minority of 
shares.170 This hardly insulates the ratification from the influ­
ence of the interested director, since a quorum could be ob­
tained without his shares but composed of a majority of shares 
sympathetic to his interests. 
In sum, I submit that the approach of Illinois and the RMA, 
while surely not perfect,111 best accommodates management's in­
terest in stability and predictability with the need to provide 
protection to all shareholders, particularly those in the minority, 
against overreaching by members of management. Shifting the 
burden of proof upon ratification accomplished according to the 
prescribed procedure should provide adequate assurance to 
management that transactions for which there is no cause for 
concern will be upheld.112 On balance, then, the enactment of a 
saving statute with an explicit allocation of the burden of proof 
best serves the interests of all of a corporation's constituent 
groups. 11s 
Ill REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31(d)(l984). 
110 Id. official comment 2(b). 
171 One may legitimately question what "fairness" means. Clearly it has both proce­
dural and substantive connotations; various definitions have been applied. For an exten­
sive discussion of this question, see Bulbulia & Pinto, supra note 14, at 223-27. The 
Exposure Draft stated that a transaction would in most cases be deemed fair "if it is a 
transaction that might reasonably have been entered into at arms-length by disinterested 
persons." REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.31 official comment (Exposure Draft 
March, 1983); see also Note, Fairness, supra note 148, at 750-56 (recommending analyti­
cal approach to be taken to new Illinois statute). 
111 Of course, it would be naive to think that "grey area" questions will not arise, 
and it is surely possible that a transaction approved in good faith will later be ruled 
voidable upon the suit of shareholders on the basis of lack of fairness. The party primar­
ily at risk in this instance is, however, the interested director. The business judgment 
rule should protect the other directors who either ratified the transaction or recom· 
mended its ratification to the shareholders. In the final analysis, then, such decisions 
may be for the most part a question of business risk for the interested director. 
178 The ALI Corporate Governance Project has taken an approach to this question 
that provides an interesting contrast to existing statutes and the RMA. For example, it 
extends the duty of loyalty to senior executives and dominating shareholders as well as 
directors; describes in detail the types of conduct which may involve breaches of the 
duty of loyalty; provides explicit allocation of the burden of proof; and is in general 
substantially more detailed than current statutes. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTI­
TUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, §§ 5.01-
5.14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, April 15, 1986). For a discussion of an earlier draft of the ALI 
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3. Loans to Management. 
The MBCA takes a simple approach to the question of 
loans to officers and directors: they are absolutely prohibited.11" 
Historically, this was a common response to what was seen as an 
inherent possibility for abuse. As has been previously discussed 
in depth in this Journal, legitimate reasons exist for imposing 
restraints on the ability of a corporation to make loans to man­
agement.171 In recent years, however, the trend has been to rec­
ognize that some such loans may have a legitimate purpose, and 
that an element of flexibility is desirable.176 Thus, Mississippi is 
now one of but four states with an explicit statutory prohibition 
of all management loans.177 Most states now provide limited cir­
cumstances under which such loans are valid,178 a position first 
taken by the Model Act in 1969.179 So long as the interests of 
shareholders, particularly those in the minority, are adequately 
protected, it would seem some modification of the rule of per se 
invalidity under the MBCA is in order.180 Again, the question is 
duty of loyalty provisions, see Sommer, supra note 155, at 726-42. 
"' Miss. Comt ANN. § 79-3-89 (1972). 
,,. See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 390-92 (discussion of loans to officers and 
directon). For other background on the subject see Mann, Moral and Ethical Problems: 
Loana to Management and Compensation Problems, 31 Bus. LAW 1305 (1976); Rich, 
Corporate Loana to Officers, Directors and Shareholders, 14 Bus. LAW. 658 ( 1959). 
"1 For example, strictly read, the MBCA could prohibit a salary advance to an 
employee. 
"' The others are Alaska, Nebraska, and Oklahoma. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.213 
0985); Nu. Rzv. STAT. § 21-2045 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.175 ( 1986). 
"' 2 Rzv1s&o Moon Bus1NBSS CoRP. Acr ANN. 1018 (3d ed. 1985). Not all recent 
1tatutet, however, have followed the trend towards codification. For example, the new 
Virginia Act makes no provision, thereby treating director loans the same as any self­
dealing transaction. See VA. Cong Coww'N REPoaT, supra note 167, at 52. 
'" Moon BUSINllSS CoRP. A<:r § 47 (1969). The 1969 Model Act prohibited loans to 
dir�n unlesa authorized by the shareholders, but permitted loans to employees (in­
cluding employee. who were directors) if the board of directors determined that the loan 
might benefit the corporation. The comments to section 47 stated that "business purpoee 
or benefit to the corporation" wu the criterion for determining the validity of employee 
lo.na. 1 Moon BustNUS CoRP. A<:r ANN. § 47, 11 2, at 950-51 (2d ed. 197 1 ). 
. •• ��bly, of COUlle, crediton are a second group whose interests should be con­
eidered in th11 regard. See, e.g., Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 392 (suggesting that 
manqement loans ahould be subject to same limitations as corporate distributions in 
order � p�otect creditors). For a variety of reaaons, I do not believe that the potential 
for p�e1ud1ce to creditors i1 aubttantial enough to justify such a rule. At least insofar as 
the �11hta of contract creditors are concerned, other adequate safeguards exist. A major 
crfditor could, for example, impoee contractual limitations on management loans as a 
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whether the RMA provision accomplishes this purpose. 
Section 8.32 of the RMA permits loans to directors under 
either of two circumstances. The first is that the loan is ap­
proved by a majority of the outstanding shares of all classes vot­
ing as a single voting group181 with the interested director's 
shares being disqualified.182 The second is that the board of di­
rectors determines that the loan benefits the corporation and ap­
proves either the particular loan or a general plan authorizing 
loans.183 
I submit that each of these provisions should be modified 
before enactment in Mississippi. As to the first, one of the most 
compelling reasons for restricting loans to directors is to guard 
against majority oppression of minority shareholders, 18' particu­
larly in closely-held corporations. Merely disqualifying the votes 
of the interested director himself does not, in my view, ade­
quately guard against this possibility. On the other hand, in a 
public corporation (where such loans are less likely to occur on 
an individualized basis) no greater statutory protection is proba­
bly needed. Thus, section 8.32 should be amended to permit a 
corporation to impose a higher (even unanimous) vote require­
ment in its articles or bylaws. This would permit minority share­
holders in a closely-held corporation to guard against such 
problems as a matter of negotiation at the time the corporation 
is formed. 186 
For similar reasons, the RMA goes too far in permitting the 
condition to the extension of credit. Even in the absence of such leverage, a contract 
creditor is always free to decline to extend credit if it believes that a corporation has an 
excessive amount of management debt. Involuntary or tort creditors, of course, have 
somewhat different standing; but neither the presence of legally available surplus (to use 
the MBCA standard) nor the mere solvency of a corporation (the RMA standard for 
distributions) assures an adequate fund for the satisfaction of claims. 
Corporate distributions and applicable limitations thereon will be discussed in Part 
2 of this article. 
"' The concept of voting groups under the RMA is discussed infra at notes 289-92 
and accompanying text. '11 REVISED MODEL Bus1NBss CoRP. ACT § 8.32(a)(l)(l984). 
•u Id. § 8.32(a)(2). In each instance, the RMA treats a corporate guarantee of a 
director's indebtedness the same as a loan . 
... See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 391 (suggested majority shareholders-direc­
tors could redirect corporate assets to themselves without stockholder vote). 
'" Cf. id. at 392 (discussion of prejudice to minority shareholders). 
214 MISSISSIPPI LAW JO URNAL [VOL. 56 
board to authorize particular loans without shareholder partici­
pation. Indeed, the interested director is not even disqualified 
by the statute from voting on his own loan. Thus, I would re­
strict the discretion of the board acting alone to approve general 
plans authorizing loans to directors (as well as officers and em­
ployees), an authority which presumably would encompass such 
matters as loans of petty cash, advances for expenses incurred in 
furtherance of the corporation's business, and employee benefit 
plans. 186 Major loans made on an ad hoc basis should be ap­
proved, if at all, only by the shareholders as discussed above. 
C. Officers 
Subchapter D of Chapter 8 of the RMA, dealing with corpo­
rate officers, is substantively different from the MBCA in only 
two respects. The first appears somewhat mundane, but repre­
sents a departure from prevailing practice in most states: the 
RMA does not prescribe the designation of any particular of­
ficers, and likewise has no prohibition against an individual 
holding any two or more offices at the same time. 187 The RMA 
approach in this regard is distinctly a minority one. At present, 
only four states have similar provisions.188 Like most states, 189 
the MBCA mandates a president, secretary, and treasurer.190 
The same person cannot be both president and secretary.191 
The official explanation for deleting this statutory mandate 
in the RMA is that "little purpose is served by a statutory re­
quirement that there be certain officers, and statutory require­
ments may sometimes create problems of implied or apparent 
authority or confusion with non-statutory offices the corporation 
114 See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.32 official comment ( 1984) . 111 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.40(a), (d)(l984). 111 The four are Delaware, Illinois, North Carolina, and New York. See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 142 ( 1983); ILL. Rtv. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.50 (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 55-34 0982); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 715 (McKinney 1986). '.� See 2 
.MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT ANN. 1040-41 (3d ed. 1985)(listing of states requmng president, secretary, and treasurer) . 
. '" Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-95 (1972). The MBCA further requires "one or more vice presidents u may be provided in the bylaws;" of course, the bylaws may provide for no auch officers. Id. 
1•1 Id. 
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desires to create."192 Agency law questions aside, however, it is 
probable that the notion of mandated officers is so deeply en­
grained with most corporate practitioners that its elimination 
may engender more confusion than it saves. It is noteworthy 
that at least two states that have recently revised their corporate 
statutes with substantial reference to the RMA have rejected 
this provision, each continuing to require at least a president 
and secretary.193 
Thus, it is recommended that Mississippi continue to re­
quire that a corporation have at least a president and secretary. 
On the other hand, logically the prohibition against one person 
holding those offices simultaneously should be eliminatedm un­
less the bylaws provide otherwise. It would seem anomalous to 
permit a corporation to be governed by a board of directors com­
posed of one person and, at the same time, require the fiction of 
a separate president and secretary. Admittedly, certain business 
transactions sometimes involve the performance of formal func­
tions that would ordinarily require separate officers, such as 
cross-certification of the other's signature. It is unlikely, how­
ever, that this would pose a problem in the extremely closely­
held corporation, and realistically it is only such a corporation 
that would avail itself of this option. Should the interests of the 
participants be better served by mandating that these offices be 
separated, an appropriate provision could be inserted in the 
bylaws. 
The second distinction between the RMA and MBCA in 
this area is a matter of perhaps greater substance: as is true for 
directors, RMA Section 8.32 prescribes a standard of conduct for 
officers vested with "discretionary authority.mea In most re-
,.. REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT § 8.40 official comment ( 1984). 
ua See 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887, § 8.40(a) (effective Oct. 1, 1987); VA. CoDE ANN. § 
13.l-872(A)(repl. vol. 1985). To be fair, however, the new Illinois Business Corporation 
Act follows the RMA in this regard, although it requires bylaw authority for an individ­
ual to hold more than one office simultaneously. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.50 (Smith­
Hurd 1985). Indiana likewise adopts the RMA but requires at least one officer. IND. STAT. 
ANN. § 23-1-36-1 (Burns Supp. 1986). 
184 This is the approach taken in Virginia. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-872(A), (D)(repl. 
vol. 1985) . 
... REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.42 (1984). Interestingly, there was an 
additional element of parallelism in the Exposure Draft that was not carried over to the 
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spects, this section is substantively identical to the provision for 
directors,196 the sole difference being a more limited "safe har-
bor" right of reliance.197 . Primarily for the reasons previously discussed relatmg to 
the duty of care of directors,19s this provision of the RMA should 
not be adopted. Although it is clear that officers, as fiduciaries, 
owe duties of care and diligence to their corporations,199 few 
states, even those codifying a standard for director conduct, 
have attempted to define statutorily the scope of officers' du­
ties.200 Moreover, at least three states adopting much of the 
RMA deleted section 8.42.201 Fundamentally, though, I believe 
that such efforts are premature for Mississippi, and would rec­
ommend that no similar statute be enacted here. 202 
D. Indemnification 
Subchapter E of Chapter 8 of the RMA composes in its en­
tirety a set of complex, and potentially controversial, provisions 
involving the indemnification of corporate directors, officers, 
agents, and employees. The current "crisis" (perceived or real) 
RMA. In the Exposure Draft, the rules on conflicts of interest embraced officers as well 
u directon. As previously noted, the final draft of RMA Section 8.31 speaks only of 
directors. a decision with which I personally agree. It is curious, however, that neither 
the official comment to the RMA nor the commentary in the new Revised Model Busi­
neu Corporation Act Annotated addresses the rationale for this change. 
, .. See supra text at note 117. 
'" The statute does not grant an officer the right to rely upon data supplied by a 
committee of the board. Compare REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr § 
�.30(b)(3)( 1984)(director is entitled to rely on reports by committee of board of which he 
11 not a member and which he reasonably believes merit confidence) with id. § 8.42(b) 
(officer i11 entitled to rely on reports prepared by employees whom he reasonably believes 
to be compete�t or legal counsel as to matters within the person's expert competence). 
Presumably this reflect.a the greater degree of familiarity with corporate affairs that can 
reuonably be demanded of officers. See id. § 8.42 official comment . ... s 99 . ee !Upra notes -140 and accompanymg text. 
, .. See Ht:NN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, §§ 231-234 (discussion of duties of 
management). 
, .. See 2 REv1sw MooBL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1068 (3d ed. 1985). 
. 
"' These states are Illinois, Indiana, and Virginia. TenneBBee, however, adopted it 
without change. 1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts 887, § 8.42 . 
... I would include in this recommendation the right of reliance for officers, al­
though cer-uinly this aspect of the statute is less objectionable than the overall effort to 
define a atandard of conduct. 
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surrounding the imposition of liability on corporate fiduciaries 
for breach of their managerial responsibilities, coupled with in­
creasing restrictions on the availability and coverage of directors 
and officers ("D & 0") insurance, has focused heretofore unpar­
alleled attention on this area. 203 Clearly an entire article could 
be devoted to this one topic, but such an exegesis is beyond the 
scope of this work. In order to maintain this discussion within 
manageable bounds, some comments concerning the approach to 
be taken are in order. 
First, the Mississippi law on indemnification204 and its rela­
tionship to the 1969 Model Act have been extensively developed 
previously in this Journal. 206 That discussion is important as 
background to much that is to follow, since I will undertake no 
such detailed comparison here. Rather, other than a brief sum­
mary of existing Mississippi law, this article will focus on the 
RMA and its approach to the issue. 
Second, this article will accept the premise that the obvious 
trend nationwide is towards broad indemnification provisions, as 
evidenced by the fact that at least thirty-five states have 
adopted at least substantial equivalents to either the 1969 
Model Act or the RMA, although the exact detail of such stat­
utes varies fairly widely from state to state.206 As will be seen, 
the MBCA approach is considerably out of step with current 
statutes; thus some modification of existing Mississippi law is in 
order. On the other hand, I believe that in some respects modern 
statutes may go too far,207 although my views on this are not as 
101 An excellent comprehensive text is J. BISHOP, THE LAW or CORPORATE DIRECTORS 
AND 0PPICERS: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE ( 1982) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP, IN­
DEMNIPICATION]. For general background on recent issues in this area, see Hinsey, The 
New Lloyd's Policy Form for Directors and Officers Insurance-An Analysis, 33 Bus. 
LAw. 1961 ( 1978); Johnson, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Di­
rectors and Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 ( 1978) (hereinafter cited as Johnson]. 
104 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79-3-7(0)(1972). 
108 See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 393-98 (discussing Mississippi law on in­
demnification and its relationship to 1969 Model Act). 
109 See 2 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT ANN. 1093-99 (3d ed. 1985)(containing 
detailed analysis of existing statutes). Since that annotstion was prepared, Indiana, Ten­
nessee, and Virginia have substantially adopted the RMA provisions. 
1°' For example, under a 1986 amendment to its corporation laws, the board of di­
rectors of a Delaware corporation can adopt a general authorization of advancement of 
expenses to a director or officer, rather than requiring a case-by-case determination of 
218 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL 
{VOL. 56 
extreme as some.208 Thus, the primary purpose of this discussion 
will be to suggest those respects in which the RMA, the
. 
ap­
proach of which is generally recommended, should be modified 
to conform with sound policy. The goal, as it has been stated, 
should in all instances be to strike the balance between encour­
aging managers not to violate their duties, and discouraging 
them from serving at all.209 
In order fully to evaluate the desirability of the RMA ap­
proach to indemnification and related issues, however, a brief 
summary of current Mississippi law is necessary. The operative 
provision is section 79-3-7(0) of the MBCA. Following the pat­
tern of earlier versions of the Model Act, it only establishes the 
corporate power to indemnify; indemnification is thus elective, 
never mandatory.210 Indemnification extends only to directors 
and officers and persons who served at the corporation's request 
as a director or officer of a subsidiary corporation or a corpora­
tion of which it is a creditor. It speaks only of "expenses actually 
and reasonably incurred" in the defense of a civil or criminal 
action, suit, or proceeding. Thus, the power to indemnify for 
the entitlement to such, with the corresponding commitment by the recipient being lim· 
ited to an agreement to reimburse the corporation only if he is affirmatively determined 
not to be entitled to indemnification. DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(3)(1986). Moreover, 
the state now provides that the provisions of the Act on advancement of expenses, as 
well as indemnification, are expressly non-exclusive. Id. § 145(0. 
Indeed, in an unprecedented move, the Delaware Legislature has empowered corpo· 
rations to adopt charter provisions or amendments that eliminate or limit the personal 
liabilit� of directors for breaches of the duty of care, although liability cannot be limited 
for a director who breaches his duty of loyalty, does not act in good faith, engages in 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law, receives an improper personal 
benefit, or pays an illegal dividend or approves an illegal stock repurchase. Id. § 
102(b)(7). According to a synopsis of the new legislation, the legislature is responding to 
"��cent chan�� in the market for directors' liability insurance" resulting in an unavaila· 
bihty of trad1t1onal policies, or any type of policy from traditional insurance carriers. Cf. 
Johnson .. supr� note 203, et 2035-36 (suggesting that statutes fixing maximum liability 
for certain
. 
cle1ms may be desirable in order to allow management and insurers to evalu­
ate legal risks they are assuming). 
, .. See g B. h S .  · D : e: ·• is op, 1ttmg ucks, supra note 14 (discussing criticism of trend to· ward perm1ss1ve or management-oriented statutes). 
'00 Johnson, supra note 203, at 1994. 
uo F d. . or 1scuss1ons of the power of indemnification at common law, see J. B1sHOP, 
IND!MNIFICATION. supra note 203, ,, 5.01-5.05; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 379; 
Cheell, Control of Corporate Indemnification: A Propo!1ed Statute, 22 VAND. L. REV. 255, 258-6! ( 1969)(hereinafter cited as Cheek] .  
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judgments, settlements, or attorney's fees is unclear. Moreover, 
no distinction exists between third party and derivative actions. 
Indemnification is prohibited if the director or officer is ad­
judged liable for negligence, misconduct, or violations of the 
Mississippi antitrust or fair trade statutes; no other standard or 
conduct is addressed. The statute is expressly non-exclusive, and 
it permits "any other indemnification" authorized by the arti­
cles, bylaws, or shareholder resolution. However, it imposes no 
specific limitations on the ability of a corporation to make in­
demnification that might contravene public policy.211 Finally, 
the statute does not refer to either advancement or expenses of 
insurance. 212 
In contrast, Sections 8.50 through 8.58 of the RMA set forth 
a detailed and integrated set of rules dealing with indemnifica­
tion. The source of the provisions was an amendment to the 
1969 Model Act adopted in 1980. The RMA reorganizes that 
provision to add clarity without altering its substance.218 In gen­
eral, it deals with indemnification of three types: permissive, 
mandatory, and court ordered. It also incorporates an extensive 
and extremely useful set of definitions which apply only to sub­
chapter E. 214 
Section 8.51 establishes the criteria for permissive (or dis­
cretionary) indemnification. Under that section an individual 
who is or was a director and who is made a party to a proceed­
ing2u may b e  indemnified so long as he acted in good faith and, 
in addition, meets the following tests: (1) in the case of conduct 
in his official capacity, he reasonably believed his conduct was in 
111 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7(0)(1972); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 393-97 (cor­
poration may make indemnification in any situation authorized by articles of incorpora­
tion, bylaws, or stockholders' resolution). 
111 See Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397-98. 
•u See 2 REVISED MODEL Bus1NEss CORP. ACT ANN. 1088-91 (3d ed. 1985). Thus, an 
extremely valuable source document for understanding the RMA rules on indemnifica­
tion is Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Indemnification of 
Corporate Personnel, 34 Bus. LAW. 1595 (1979) (report of the Committee on Corporate 
Laws) [hereinafter cited as Changes Affecting Indemnification], which details the new 
law and the respects wherein it differs from the 1969 Model Act. 
114 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ar:r ANN. § 8.50 (1984). 111 "Proceeding" is defined as "any threatened, pending, or completed action, suit, 
or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or investigative and whether for­
mal or informal." Id. § 8.50(7). 
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the corporation's best interest; (2) if not acting officially, he rea­
sonably believed his conduct was at least not opposed to the cor­
poration's best interest; and (3) if in a criminal proceeding, he 
had in addition to the above no reasonable cause to believe his 
conduct was unlawful. 218 
Under this section indemnification is prohibited in two in­
stances: (1) in a derivative action where the individual was ad­
judged liable to the corporation; and (2) in any other proceed­
ings where liability is imposed on the grounds that the 
individual received an improper personal benefit.217 Finally, in a 
derivative action permissive indemnification is limited to ex­
penses (which expressly includes attorneys' fees218) incurred in 
connection with the action. 219 
This much of the RMA appears to strike an appropriate 
balance between the interests of the corporation and manage­
ment. While it certainly will allow indemnification of directors 
adjudged liable for certain breaches of duty so long as the appli­
cable standard of conduct is met,220 sufficient procedural safe­
guards are established elsewhere by the RMA to make the likeli­
hood of abuse remote. 221 Before discussing those safeguards, 
however, the more potentially controversial area of mandatory 
indemnification must be considered. 
Section 8.52 provides that a director who is "wholly success-
... Id. § 8.5l(e). A separate standard of conduct exists for ERISA claims. Id. § 
8.Sl(b) & official comment 2. 
111 Id. § 8.5l(d). 
111 Id. § 8.50(3). 
111 Id. § 8.5l(e). The commentary explains that this is intended to prevent the cor­
poration from seeking to indemnify a director for a settlement which the director has 
paid to the corporation. Judgments would of course be excluded by § 8.5l(d)(l) .  See id. § 
8.Sl(e) � official comment 5 (limits indemnification in suits brought by or in right of �orporat1on for exp�nses incurred in connection with proceedings in order to avoid circu­
ity that would be involved if corporation sought to indemnify directors for payments 
made in settlement by director to corporation). 
no It should be noted that the standard defined in § 8.51 is not a purely subjective 
on�; rather, both the subjective
_ 
test of good faith and the objective test of reasonabl� 
behef must be met. Arguably this could work to the detriment of the "honest but dumb 
director. At the same time, however, it serves 88 a check upon the ability to indemnify a 
party who may be admittedly liable. For criticism of the objective standard see Cheek, 
supra note 210, et 279-80. 
111 Cf. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 395-96 (discussing similar issues under 1969 
Model Act). 
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ful on the merits or otherwise" in a proceeding is entitled to 
payment of his reasonable expenses. 222 The idea that the direc­
tor must be "wholly successful" is a salutary one; it is intended 
to preclude the possibility of partial indemnification of a direc­
tor who successfully defends some but not all counts, a result 
that had been reached under other statutes. 223 The objection to 
the statute, however, should be obvious: the "or otherwise" lan­
guage could make mandatory the indemnification of a director 
who, for example, might be liable for breach of the duty of loy­
alty yet have a valid procedural defense such as the statute of 
limitations. 224 
Admittedly, this provision appears in most indemnification 
statutes. The justification given by the drafters of the RMA for 
this seeming anomaly is that a defendant with a valid procedural 
defense should not be put to the burden of a long and expensive 
trial on the merits merely to establish his right to indemnifica­
tion. 2211 While this may doubtless have merit in some situations, 
I believe that for public policy reasons mandatory indemnifica­
tion should be limited to persons who are successful on the mer­
its. 226 I submit that this imposes no undue burden on the direc­
tor with a valid procedural defense, because the RMA would still 
allow him to seek permissive indemnification, so long as the re­
quirements of section 8.51 are met,237 or to seek court-ordered 
indemnification128 in other instances.219 
112 REvrsED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. ACT § 8.52 (1984)(emphasis added). 
111 Id. official comment. The notorious case to the contrary was Merritt-Chapman & 
Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. 1974), which held that a defendant who suc­
cessfully obtained the dismissal of some but not all counts of an indictment was entitled 
to partial indemnification. Id. at 141. 
214 Hamilton, Reflections, supra note 8, at 1465 n.30. 
m REvrsED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 8.52 official comment (1984); Hamilton, 
Reflections, supra note 8, at 1465 n.30; see also BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203, 
� 6.12, at 70 ( defendant who is otherwise successful by pleading statute of limitations 
creates no right to indemnity, which may encourage unnecessary prolongation of costly 
litigation). 
11' This is the approach taken in California. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 317(d) (West 
1985)(mandatory indemnification is limited to persons who are successful on merits of 
their suit). 
117 See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text. 
m See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text. 11• Cf. Cheek, supra note 210, at 282-83 n.117 (limiting mandatory indemnificati�n 
to persons successful on merits of suit does not impose harsh burden on those who win 
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The third method of indemnification under the RMA is that 
by court order. Subject to limitation in the articles of incorpora­
tion a director may apply to the court conducting a proceeding 
or a'nother court of competent jurisdiction for an order of in­
demnification.280 Indemnification can then be ordered in two in­
stances: first, to enforce a right to mandatory indemnification;231 
or second, because the court determines that "the director is 
fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnification in view of all 
the relevant circumstances," whether or not his conduct meets 
the standard of section 8.51 or notwithstanding that he was ad­
judicated liable in a derivative action or for receipt of an im­
proper personal benefit. In this latter instance, however, indem­
nification is limited to reasonable expenses incurred. 232 
On balance, the RMA provision on court-ordered indemnifi­
cation appears to be a desirable addition. Changes in control, for 
instance, may motivate a corporation to refuse to make 
mandatory indemnification or to decline a request for permissive 
indemnification without valid reason. Some enforcement or re­
view mechanism is, therefore, clearly indicated. 
In order to obtain discretionary indemnification under sec-
on technicalities). It would seem unlikely that a corporation would, for example, refuse 
to indemnify a director who clearly meets the standard of § 8.51; even if it should, how­
ever, the director would still have recourse to a court to seek an order compelling indem­
nification on that basis. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54(2) (1984)(direc­
tor is entitled to indemnification in view of all relevant circumstances whether or not he 
met standards in § 8.51 or waa adjudged to be liable). 
llO REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54 (1984). 1�1 Id. § 8.54�1)(1984). In this instance the court is also required to award the direc­
tor hl8 expenses Incurred in obtaining court-ordered indemnification. Id. 111 Id. § 8.54(2). Thus court-ordered indemnification would be the sole means 
whereby a director could obtain indemnification with respect to derivative suits or im­
proper benefit. Id. official comment. 
O� course, one might question the appropriateness of granting any indemnification 
to a duector who has been adjudged liable to his corporation for breach of duty. The 
drafters of the RM� apparently felt, however, that an absolute prohibition on su�h 
awards w� l� desir.a�le than delegating such discretion to a presumably im
partial 
court. While this prov1S1on may provide some comfort to management, it seems unlikely 
that such awards would be made with any frequency. Only in truly extraordinary circuzn· 
stances (as, for example, where a court might establish a new legal standard of conduct 
much stricter than a director could have reasonably anticipated) would it seem possible 
t�at a court would �ke su�h ac�ion. Johnson, supra note 203, at l997. In any event, the 
right to seek such mdemnification can be eliminated in the corporation's articles. RE­
VISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.54 official comment (1984). 
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tion 8.51 ,  a director must first establish that he has met the 
standards established by that section.233 The determination of 
eligibility is to be made by either (1) a majority of a quorum of 
directors not parties to the proceeding, or, if such a quorum can­
not be obtained, by majority vote of a committee appointed by 
the entire board, which consists of two or more directors who are 
not parties;234 (2) by special legal counsel;236 (3) or by the share­
holders excluding the votes of directors who are parties to the 
proceeding. 238 Assuming that it is determined that indemnifica­
tion is permissible, the RMA then requires a separate authoriza­
tion of indemnification, which is usually made by the same body 
which determined that indemnification was permissible. 237 
To be sure, this procedure can be criticized on various 
grounds.288 On the whole, however, I believe that it provides a 
181 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.55(a) (1984). 
IU Id. § 8.55(b)(l) & (2)(1984). 
911 Id. § 8.55(3). By use of the term "special legal counsel," the RMA has reference 
to attorneys with no prior profeBSional relationship to those seeking indemnification, who 
are retained for the special occasion, and who are neither inside counsel or regular 
outside counsel. Id. official comment. In so doing, the RMA wisely avoids the ambiguities 
posed by some statutes (including earlier versions of the Model Act) which speak of 
"independent legal counsel." See, BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203, ' 6.03(9], at 
45-46 (requisite independence of "independent legal counsel" is uncertain); Johnson, 
supra note 203, at 1998-99 (indemnification under Delaware law must be authorized 
upon determination by board of directors or by "independent legal counsel" or by stock­
holders). On the other hand, the RMA rejects the approach of at least one state, Ohio, in 
defining the counsel eligible to serve. See Oum REV. CODE § 1701.13(E')(4) (Page 
1985)(counsel cannot quality as "independent" if he or his firm has been retained by or 
has performed services for corporation or person to be indemnified within previous five 
years); Changes Affecting Indemnification, supra note 213, at 1612 (characterization of 
legal counsel authorized to make required determination has been changed from "inde­
pendent" to "special"; change is not intended to indicate that counsel chosen should not 
be independent in accordance with governing ethical precepts). 
tat REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.55(b)(4)(1984) . 
.., Id. § 8.55(c). The exception is where special legal counsel determined the permis­
sibility of indemnification, in which event authorization is made by the body empowered 
to appoint counsel under § 8.55(b)(3). According to the comments, the factors to be con­
sidered in this authorization include the reasonableness of expenses, the financial ability 
of the corporation to pay, and the e:xtent to which resources should be allocated to this 
or some other purpose. Id. official comment. 
•aa For e:xample, one might question the extent to which other directors can truly 
exercise disinterested judgment when dealing with a colleague. Moreover, it is doubtful 
whether many attorneys would be willing to opine as to such matters, rendering this an 
impracticable alternative. See Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999 (discussing problems in­
herent in obtaining opinion of independent counsel); cf. Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 
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workable structure that adequately protects the interests of 
shareholders, with two exceptions. First, I do not believe that 
the decisions on eligibility or authorization should be delegated 
to a committee. If a quorum of disinterested directors (i.e., di­
rectors not parties to the proceeding) cannot be obtained, eligi­
bility should be determined only by special counsel or the share­
holders,238 with the final decision on authorization left to the 
shareholders alone. The participation of interested directors 
should be limited solely to the designation of special counsel in 
instances where that alternative is adopted. 240 
Second, I would enact the requirement imposed by the 1979 
amendments to the Model Act, as modified in part in the RMA, 
that any indemnification of a director made in accordance with 
the statute be reported in writing to the shareholders either 
prior to or together with the notice of the next succeeding share­
holders' meeting.241 Such disclosure may provide a significant 
procedural safeguard against abuse of the indemnification pro­
cess and should be adopted by Mississippi. 242 
One of the most practically important aspects of indemnifi­
cation under the RMA is the authorization of advancement of 
395-96 (determinations made by independent legal counsel are questionable but lack of 
reasonable alternatives makes solution acceptable) .  
111 This was the approach of the 1969 Model Act. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 5(d) 
( 1969) . 
. s.o This, of course, would necessitate rewording of § 8.55(b) and (c) to conform w�th 
this result: The drafters of the RMA take the position that the somewhat more e
xtensive 
role sanctioned by § 8.55 is "justified by a principle of necessity." REVISED MoDEL BU
SI­
NESS CoRP. Ar:r § 8.55 official comment (1984). While it is surely true that it facilitate
s 
the p�ocess, particularly in the publicly-held corporation, in this respect the RMA seem
s 
to s:!�g the balance too far in the interests of management. 
REVISED MoDEL Bus1NEss CoRP. Ar:r § 16.21(a)(1984); MonEL BUSINESS CoR
P. 
Acr § 50Hl980). By use of the words " in accordance with " the 1979 amendment con­
templated not only any indemnification made under the s�tute, but also pursuant to 
a 
charter, bylaw, or other provision in accordance with the statute. The Committee �n 
Corp�rate .Laws apparently believed that reporting of mandatory or court-ordere
d m­
demmficatlon was n�t m�dated by § 5(1). See Changes in Indemnification, supra n
ote 
2 1�, at 1615 (reporting of indemnification payments or advances to nondirectors not 
re­
quired by § 5(1)). The . "in accordance with" language would, however, seem 
broad 
enough to encompass this as well . 
.... See Cheek, supra note 210, at 288 (such notice is necessary to provide full pr
o-
tection to corporate officers and thus has been ad t d f . 1 . · oposed mod
el 
op e or me us10n in pr 
statute); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 396 (same). 
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expenses, a p rovision that, as previously noted, is absent in Mis­
sissippi. Under section 8.53, advancement or payment of reason­
able expenses can be made if  ( 1 )  the director states in writing 
his good faith belief that he meets the criteria of section 8.51; (2) 
the director undertakes in writing to repay the advance if it is 
ultimately determined that he did not meet the applicable stan­
dard; and (3)  a determination is made pursuant to the procedure 
of section 8.55 that " the facts then known . . .  d o  not preclude 
indemnification. "243 
Given the potentially crushing burden of legal expenses 
alone in protracted proceedings, this provision is clearly reasona­
ble. Without it, eventual indemnification may as a practical mat­
ter be meaningless to the director who has already suffered fi­
nancial ruin as a result of legal fees. While one might argue that 
the "undertaking" to repay should be secured in order to guar­
antee repayment, this may work only to discriminate unfairly 
against the less wealthy director who cannot afford security.244 
Moreover, the same procedure for determining eligibility and 
authorizing payment must be followed as for discretionary in­
demnification, again providing an adequate safeguard against 
abuse. 
As previously noted, the MBCA only specifically extends 
the power to indemnify to directors and officers, although the 
"any other i ndemnification" language could be construed to al­
low indemnification of agents and employees pursuant to provi­
sions in the articles, bylaws, or by shareholder resolution. The 
RMA separately provides for indemnification of officers, employ­
ees, and agents, and treats them in a manner distinct from di­
rectors in some instances. In substance, the operation of Section 
8.56 of the RMA is as follows: officers, employees, and agents of 
the corporation who are not directors may receive discretionary 
indemnification on the same basis as directors under section 
10 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.53(a), (c)(l984). 
a.. Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999. Moreover, as previously noted in this Journal, 
"inability to pay" is a risk taken not only by the corporation which makes advances; the 
corporation itself may be financially unable to provide discretionary indemnification 
which is clearly justified, or mandatory indemnification pursuant to a court decree. See 
Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397 (corporation may be financially unable to indemnify 
director even though he is entitled to indemnification as matter of right). 
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8.51. In light of their different capacities and the different duties 
that may attach thereto, however, the RMA also allows a corpo­
ration to provide broader indemnification rights than does the 
statute, whether by the articles, bylaws, board action or con­
tract, subject only to the overriding limitation of public policy. 
Second, officers who are not directors (but not employees or 
agents) have the same right to mandatory indemnification as di­
rectors. In each of these cases, however, the articles can limit the 
rights otherwise granted by statute. Finally, directors who also 
serve in another capacity are in all events limited to indemnifi­
cation under the other sections of subchapter E.2411 
Clearly it is salutary to extend indemnification to employees 
and agents. The major disadvantage of the RMA is the lack of 
clarity in the "public policy" limitation to the expansion of in­
demnification rights for non-director officers, employees and 
agents. 149 While the interests of simplicity would be served by 
making the indemnification provisions for such persons coexten­
sive with those of directors, the RMA is probably correct in con­
cluding that different considerations might apply to them that 
would make the limitations imposed upon director indemnifica­
tion inappropriate. Moreover, any board action in this regard is 
subject to the obligations of the duty of care, and just as broader 
rights can be extended by corporate action, even the statutory 
rights can be eliminated by provision in the articles. 
On a related point, even as to directors the RMA is nonex­
clusive; that is, it recognizes that corporations may make provi­
sions for indemnification of directors in their articles, bylaws, or 
otherwise. This would permit, for example, a provision mandat­
ing indemnification that would otherwise be permissive, or com­
mitments to indemnify directors to the fullest extent permitted 
by law.147 The RMA, however, clarifies an ambiguity in earlier 
versions of the Model Act and in some other states with nonex­
clusive provisions by explicitly providing that such provisions 
1'" R&v1s10 Moon BUSINESS CoRP. Acr § 8.56 & official comment (1984) . 
... Cf. Johnson, !upra note 203, at 2009-1 1  (since limits of permissible indemnifica· 
tion are unclear under existing law, adoption of bylaw or charter provisions stating that 
corporation ehall indemnify directors and officers " to  the full extent permitted by law" 
may be bett alternative). 
"' REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 8.58(a) official comment ( 1984). 
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must be consistent with subchapter E.241 Thus under no circum­
stances can indemnification for directors be broadened beyond 
that permitted by the RMA. The RMA approach is desirable 
and should be followed. 
The final significant provision of subchapter E involves di­
rectors and officers insurance, 249 an issue not addressed by the 
MBCA. 2110 Generally D & 0 coverage has two aspects: reimburse­
ment to the corporation for amounts paid to individuals pursu­
ant to indemnification laws, and direct liability coverage to di­
rectors and officers for liabilities and expenses for which a 
corporation cannot legally indemnify them, such as liability to 
the corporation itself for negligence. This latter coverage would 
also extend to instances where the corporation could make in­
demnification but does not, either because it is insolvent or con­
trol has changed. 211  
A potentially controversial aspect of the RMA is that it, like 
many modern statutes,2112 permits the corporation to purchase 
insurance for a director, officer, agent or employee, against lia-
1" Id. The question frequently posed was whether a nonexclusive statute could be 
effectively circumvented merely by provisions in the articles or bylaws, and the extent of 
public policy restraints on such provisions. See, e.g., BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 
203, � 6.03[1) [a] (discussing ambiguities arising from use of nonexclusive language and 
extent to which courts will enforce); Cheek, supra note 210, at 276-78 (nonexclusive 
clause minimizes effectiveness by injecting elements of uncertainty as to how far courts 
will allow corporations to go); Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 396-97 (limitations on 
indemnification are easy to circumvent); Johnson, supra note 203, at 1996 (bylaws or 
agreements could be drafted providing for more extensive protection than specified in 
other provisions of nonexclusive statutes although public policy limits extent to which 
bylaws or agreements may exceed statutory formulation). 
10 Presumably the "other indemnification" language of Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-
7(0)(1972) could be construed to authorize the purchase of such insurance. 
26° For general background on D & 0 insurance policies see BISHOP, INDEMNIFICA­
TION, supra note 203, n 8.01-8.07; Hinsey, supra note 108; Johnson, supra note 203, at 
2012-36. 
201 See BISHOP, INDEMNIFICATION, supra note 203, 11 8.03[1] (any cost which is law­
fully indemnifiable is also "insurable"); Johnson, supra note 203, at 2013-23, 2034-36 
(discussing coverage of D & O policies and liabilities that cannot be covered by corporate 
indemnification or D & O liability insurance). Of course, various exclusions exist, those 
most notable being uninsurable risks and matters such as dishonesty, self-dealing, and 
willful misconduct. Johnson, supra note 203, at 2035. 
161 E.g., CAL. CoRP. CODE § 317(i) (West 1985) (corporation may purchase insurance 
on behalf of agent of corporation against liability whether or not corporation would have 
power to indemnify agent against such liability under provisions of this section). 
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bilities arising from his status as such, whether or not the corpo­
ration would have the power to indemnify him under sections 
8.51 and 8.52. 263 Arguments have been made on policy grounds 
that the corporation's power to purchase insurance should be 
limited to liabilities for which statutory indemnification is per­
mitted. 354 That objection, however, seems misplaced, because 
the exclusions contained in D & 0 policies are consistent with 
generally accepted notions of public policy. Moreover, the stat­
ute does not make an uninsurable risk insurable. HG The effect, 
then, is to render the purchase of insurance by the corporation a 
form of compensation, which should be a matter within the 
board's discretion. 2118 Thus, I would recommend the adoption of 
section 8.57 in its present form. 
E. Shareholders267 
1. Voting of Shares. 
The most obvious and potentially significant departure of 
the RMA from the MBCA provisions on voting is the elimina­
tion of compulsory cumulative voting. A majority of states now 
make cumulative voting elective.268 Mississippi is one of a hand­
ful that has a constitutional mandate for cumulative voting.211• 
Ill REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.57 (1984) . 
... See, e.g., Hodge & Perry, supra note 2, at 397 (current Model Act authorizes 
corporations to purchase insurance covering liability of director even if corporation 
would not have power to indemnify him against such liability). 
1" Johnson, supra note 203, at 1999-2000, 2016-21, 2034-36 . 
... But cf. Cheek, supra note 210, at 273-74 (although insurance should be consid­
ered compensation, director indemnification should not be considered justified as part of 
executive's compensation protecting him against future liability which has not arisen 
since payment is predicated on determinations of liability or on settlements, in which 
case corporations must reimburse executive). 117 This section will discuss shareholders only in the context of their general role in 
the statutory scheme of management and control. Other issues relating to capitalization 
(e.g., preemptive rights), shareholder litigation, and shareholders in the context of the 
closely-held corporation will be dealt with in Part 2 of this article . 
... 1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 676 (3d ed. 1985). The 1950 Model 
Act, upon which the MBCA was based, made cumulative voting mandatory. Beginning in 
1960, however, the option of permissive cumulative voting was recognized, and the 1969 
Model Act eliminated mandatory cumulative voting altogether as an option in section 33. 
Id. at 673. 
m Miss. CoNST. art. VII, § 194. The others are Arizona, Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, 
South Dakota, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XIV, § 10; IDAHO CoNST. art. XI, 
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Section 7.28(b) of the RMA denies the right of cumulative vot­
ing unless the corporation "opts in" by its articles of 
incorporation. 260 
Whether accomplished by an "opt in" or "opt out" provi­
sion, mandatory cumulative voting should be eliminated in Mis­
sissippi. Given its traditional justification, i. e., the facilitation of 
minority representation on the board of directors, the broad rea­
sons for this recommendation are twofold: in the public corpora­
tion, it serves little purpose at all, and in the closely-held corpo­
ration, it does not provide an efficient, or even effective, means 
to its avowed end. 
Specifically, in the public corporation it is unlikely that any 
group of shareholders will pool sufficient votes, and then cumu­
late their votes with the requisite common guiding intelligence, 
to alter the outcome of an election where management has solic­
ited proxies. Thus, in most instances mandatory cumulative 
voting serves only to unnecessarily complicate the election 
process.261 
In the closely-held business, there are other devices that are 
simply more effective in ensuring minority representation on the 
board such as shareholders' agreements providing for the elec­
tion of certain persons, classification of shares with different 
classes entitled to elect a specified number of directors, or 
supermajority vote provisions which could give the minority an 
§ 4; Kv. CoNST. § 207; Mo. CONST. art. XI, § 6; S.D. CoNST. art. XVII, § 5; W. VA. CoNsT. 
art. XI, § 4. 
An extensive body of literature exists debating the merits of cumulative voting. For 
general reference see Axley, The Case Against Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wrs. L. REV. 
278; Bhagat & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting 
Rights, 27 J. LAW & EcoN. 339 ( 1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 
26 J. LAW OP EcoN. 395 (1983); Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, 15 Bus. LAW. 
316 (1960); Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550 
(1961); Young, The Case for Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wrs. L. REV. 49. 
no REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 7.28(b)(1984). 
"1 This situation assumes, of course, the ordinary election in which there has been 
no countervailing solicitation by an insurgent group seeking to oust incumbent directors. 
It is only fair to say that these are contrary views of cumulative voting in public corpora­
tions. See, e.g., Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 259, at 340-41 (discussing proponents' 
arguments in favor of cumulative voting); Sobieski, supra note 259, (importance of cu­
mulative voting to minority shareholders); Young, supra note 259, at 49-56 (arguing in 
favor of statute granting shareholders the right to cumulative voting). 
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effective veto of any election that did not include minority rep­
resentation. 282 The "protection" of cumulative voting is more 
apparent than real, since its impact can easily be undercut by 
staggering the board of directors or simply reducing the size of 
the board.283 Indeed, mandatory cumulative voting may be di­
rectly disadvantageous to minority stockholders, in that it may 
obscure the need for more explicit and careful planning of the 
parties' relationship.284 
To be sure, the issues involved in eliminating mandatory cu­
mulative voting are not entirely clear cut, and substantial debate 
continues on the question. Still, Mississippi is in a shrinking mi­
nority in rendering it nonelective. Of course, cumulative voting 
should be available as a planning device to those who desire it. 
It should not, however, be forced arbitrarily upon those corpora­
tions for which it is clearly inappropriate. Thus, I would recom­
mend the amendment of the Mississippi Constitution to elimi­
nate compulsory cumulative voting and the enactment of an 
elective provision similar to the RMA. 
On the other hand, if the election of cumulative voting is 
made, the RMA engrafts procedural impediments upon the exer­
cise of that right which should not be adopted. Specifically, even 
if cumulative voting rights exist, under the RMA shares cannot 
be voted cumulatively unless the notice of the meeting or proxy 
statement states conspicuously that cumulative voting is author­
ized, or a shareholder gives not less than 48 hours notice of his 
111 8 H & " · t' g  . ee, e.�. , .  ENN ru.EXANDER, supra note 53, § 265, at 719 (discussing vo 111 alternatives withm closely-held corporations)' Comment The Constitutionality of the 
1�3 Ill�nois Business Corporation Act's Voti�g Provisio:i,, 1985 u. ILL. L. REV. 647, 6�3 
(d1scussmg effects of cumulative voting). Certain of these devices will be discussed 
in 
Part 2 of this article. 
sea �ee HE.NN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 496 (outlining ways to weaken 
cumulat�ve vot�ng); Hamilton, Reflections, supra note 8 at 1468_69 (discussing effects of 
cumulative votmg). In Mississippi, reduction of the oo:U.d's size could be accomplished 
by amendment of the by-laws by the board, absent contrary provision in the artic
les. 
Miss. CODE AN�. §§ 79-3-51, :69 (1972). Classifying or staggering the board must, how· eve�, be authorized by the articles, so that admittedly it is procedurally more difficult to 
achieve. Id. § 79-3-71. 
194 Cf. Hamilton,. Refl�ctions, supra note 8, at 1468-69 (corporations may be willing 
to structure . 
transactions m manner which circumvents statute giving impression th
at 
statute provides greater protection than actually exists). 
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intent to cumulate. 265 If the corporation elects cumulative vot­
ing, there seems to be no justification for permitting such obvi­
ous methods of circumventing that right. No sanction is imposed 
by the RMA on management for failing to give such notice (al­
though it is required by the SEC proxy rules),286 and it is un­
likely that the average shareholder would have sufficient sophis­
tication and knowledge of the law to expect him to comply. Only 
a few states have adopted similar notice requirements287 and the 
drafters' assertion that it is intended to ensure that all voting 
shareholders understand the rules is not compelling. 288 This pro­
vision, then, should be eliminated in Mississippi. 
A final aspect of section 7.28 that deserves comment is the 
provision for the election of directors by a plurality of votes. 169 
Prior versions of the Model Act were simply silent on the ques­
tion of the vote required to elect a director,270 although there 
seems to be a common assumption that it is by a plurality. 271 
The MBCA likewise makes no such reference. 272 As a practical 
matter, of course, this rule is necessary in any corporation where 
shares are factionalized to the extent that no group can muster a 
majority of votes. Since the RMA provides a corporation the op-
111 REVISED MoDEL BusrNEss CORP. Acr § 7.28(d)(1984). 
29• 1 7  C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(5)(c) (1986). Likewise, it would be only fair to note that 
the SEC has generally encouraged cumulative voting whenever it has been in a position 
to do so. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 497-98 n.24. 
m 1 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 676 (3d ed. 1985). 
188 See REVISED MooEL BusINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.28 official comment (2)(1984) . 
.. , REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.28(a)(1984). It should be noted that the 
RMA adopts the general rule of one vote per share subject to contrary provisions in the 
articles. The Exposure Draft took the position that different voting rights could be ex­
tended to shares of the same class. REVISED MODEL BusrNESs CORP. Acr § 7.21 official 
comment (l)(Exposure Draft March, 1983). The RMA deleted this statement, thereby 
casting doubt on the question. In any event, under the MBCA nonvoting common stock 
is not permitted and all common stock, regardless of class, has the right to one vote per 
share. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-27, -63 ( 1972). The RMA provides desirable flexibility for 
control arrangements in the closely-held corporation and is preferable. This iSBue will be 
more fully developed in Part 2. 
"° See, e.g., MODEL BusrNEss CoRP. Acr § 35 (1969)(no mention of voting require­
ments for election of director). 
971 See, e.g. , HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 189, at 494 (discussing voting 
techniques used to elect directors). 
"1 See Miss. Com! ANN. § 79-3-69 (1972)(no mention of voting requirements for 
election of director). 
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tion of selecting a different regime, this is an appropriate clarifi­
cation of existing law. 
The RMA would effect a needed change in Mississippi law 
by providing some guidance on the circumstances under whic� a 
proxy may be irrevocable. The MBCA makes no reference to ir­
revocable proxies,273 thus leaving the question to be resolved by 
application of the common law doctrine of proxies coupled with 
an interest. Section 7 .22 of the RMA provides that a proxy will 
be irrevocable if it so states in a conspicuous manner and if the 
appointment is coupled with an interest; it then enumerates 
non-exclusive examples of such appointments.27"' In addition, a 
safe harbor provision permits the corporation to accept a proxy's 
authority notwithstanding the death or incapacity of the grant­
ing shareholder unless notice is received before the proxyholder 
votes.275 
The RMA also contains various provisions of an essentially 
procedural nature that would be desirable additions to the 
MBCA. For example, section 7 .04 elaborates on the process of 
effecting shareholder action by unanimous consent, clarifying (as 
is true for directors) that such action can be taken by signing 
separate documents describing the action taken. Moreover, no­
tice of such action must be given to holders of any nonvoting 
shares who would have been entitled to notice of a meeting.27
6 
Unlike the corresponding provision for directors, 277 however, sec­
tion 7.04 is curiously ambiguous on the question of the effective 
time of such consent and the right of a shareholder to withdraw 
::: See id. § 79-3-63 (statute dealing with voting of shares). 
. 
�EVISED MODEL Bus1NESs CoRP. ACT § 7.22(d)(1984). Proxies coupled with an 
mterest include th�se held by a pledgee, a purchaser of the stockholder's shares, a credi­
tor �f the corporation who required the appointment as a condition to the extension of 
credit, an emplo�ee 0� the corporation whose contract required appointment, or a party 
�o a s?are?olders voting agreement. Any such appointment is revoked when the interest 
1s extinguished. Id. § 7.22(0. 
m Id. § 7·22(e). The rule at common law, of course, is that death or disability of the shareholder revokes a proxy automatically HENN & A te 53 § 196 
RM 




A �!so protects a bona fide purchaser of shares as to which an irrevocable proxy as en given. If the certificate ( · r · "fi . or miormation statement for shares without cert• -cates) does not conspicuously n te th · 
· 
h to 
k th · t R 
0 e appomtment, such a purchaser has the rig t revo e e appom ment. Ev1sEo MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT § 7 22(g) m Id. § 7.04(a),(d). · · · 
111 s ee supra notes 90-91 and accomp . te anymg xt. 
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his consent. The comments assert thafconsent action is effective 
only when the last consent is received by the secretary of the 
corporation and that any shareholder is free to withdraw his 
consent before that time;278 explicit language to that effect in the 
statute itself seems a preferable alternative. 
Recognizing that the shares of many publicly held compa­
nies are registered in the name of a nominee, the RMA permits 
(but does not require) corporations to establish procedures 
whereby the beneficial owners of such shares can be "recog­
nized" by the corporation as the shareholders. 279 Although the 
extent of this recognition is to be as defined in the procedure, 
the comments clearly contemplate the right not only to receive 
communications but also to vote the shares so registered, thus 
bypassing the nominee. 280 
A feature of the RMA that is of particular benefit to the 
publicly held company is  the fairly detailed set of rules in sec­
tion 7.24 dealing with a corporation's acceptance of votes, con­
sents, waivers, or proxy appointments. 281 Recurring and fre­
quently vexing problems arise in attempting to reconcile and 
decipher ambiguous signatures or those that do not correspond 
to the corporation's records, and section 7.24 provides needed 
measures of guidance and protection. In particular, the corpora­
tion is authorized to reject any vote or related document if the 
responsible officer has a good faith, reasonable belief about the 
validity of the signature or about the signatory's authority to 
sign for the corporation, and both the corporation and responsi­
ble officer are absolved from liability for a rejection which meets 
this standard. 282 
An important change in the RMA appears in the general 
provisions concerning voting. Under the MBCA, shareholder ac­
tion is deemed effective if there is a quorum at the meeting and 
there is an affirmative vote of a majority of the shares repre-
178 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.22 official comment 2 (1984). 
178 Id. § 7.23(a). 
180 Id. official comment. 181 Id. § 7.24. The comments to this section are particularly useful in illustrating the 
possible applications of the rules to various situations. 
181 Id. § 7.24(c). 
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sented at the meeting.111 The effect of this is to treat an absten­
tion as a negative vote. In some insta nces this may lead to 
anomalous results. Shareholders who may be indifferent to the 
resolution of a specific matter may effectively defeat it simply by 
manifesting that indifference. The RMA adopts a rule that is 
probably more consistent with a layperson 's expectation, that 
being that action is effective if the votes cast in favor of an ac­
tion exceed those cast against it, subject to contrary p rovisions 
of the articles or the statute . .. • This may, of course, lead to ap­
proval by less than a majority of a quorum, but the basis for the 
RMA rule is at least as rational as the traditional response to 
abstentions and should be adopted. 
On an issue, the RMA contains a blanket authorization for 
supermajority quorum or voting requirements for any share­
holder action; such provisions must of course appear in the arti­
cles. A procedural safeguard also prevents alteration of any such 
provision except by compliance with the standard that is the 
subject of the proposed amendment. •ea 
In one respect, the RMA would create an ambiguity that 
does not exist under the MBCA. Section 61 of the MBCA allows 
the articles of incorporation to set a less-than-majority quorum 
requirement for shareholders, but not less than one-third.19• Ap­
parently in the belief that the one-third limitation was unduly 
restrictive, the RMA eliminated that provision.287 Section 7.27, 
however, authorizes only a greater than majority quorum.  By 
implication, this would prohibit a less than majority quorum, 
absent some modification of the statutory language. Thus, sec­
tion 7 .27 should be amended to permit the articles to fix a quo­
rum requirement of no fewer than one-third of the 
shareholders. 188 
11• Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972). 
1" REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.25(c)(l984). 
111 Id. § 7.27. Thus a provision requiring the affirmative vote of 80"� of all shares to 
take action could not be amended except by the same vote. 
111 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972). 
117 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 7.25 official comment 5 (1984). 
111 This is also the rule as to directors. See id. § 8.24(a), (b); see also supra note 94-
95 and accompanying text. 
The RMA treats differently the issue of the withdrawal of directors or shareholders 
once a quorum is constituted. Under section 8.24(c) , 8 quorum must at all times be pre· 
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Older versions of the Model Act and the MBCA recognized 
the right of certain classes of shares to vote separately on some 
issues. 289 The RMA introduces the general notion of voting by 
voting group. A voting group is defined as "all shares of one or 
more classes or series that under the articles of incorporation or 
this Act are entitled to vote and be counted together collectively 
on a matter at a meeting of shareholders. "290 Thus, pref erred 
shares with class voting rights in the MBCA would be consid­
ered a voting group under the RMA, as would common shares 
with special voting rights, which are currently not permitted by 
the MBCA. 281 
The effect of sections 7.25 and 7.26 of the RMA is to impose 
on each voting group separately the quorum and voting rules of 
the Act. Thus, if separate approval of a voting group is required 
for a transaction, the quorum and voting standards must be met 
for each voting group. 
On the other hand, section 1.40 provides that "[a]ll shares 
entitled by the articles of incorporation or this Act to vote gen­
erally on [a] matter are for that purpose a single voting 
group. "292 Thus, if a class of shares is to be treated as a voting 
group, appropriate provisions to that effect m ust be made in the 
articles. Draftsmen thus should be aware that separate voting 
sent in order for a valid board vote to take place. Thus, directors may prevent action 
from being taken by simply withdrawing from the meeting. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS 
CORP. AcT § 8.24(c)(l984). This is not possible under section 7.25(b); once a share is 
represented at a meeting of shareholders for any purpose (including objection to the 
transaction of business), it is deemed to be present thereafter at all times for purposes of 
determining a quorum. Id. § 7.25(b). This rule also applies to any adjournment for which 
a new record date is not set. Thus shareholders cannot withdraw and "break the quo­
rum," an issue upon which courts have reached different conclusions. REVISED MODEL 
BUSINESS CoRP. ACT §§ 7.25(c) & official comment 3, 8.24(c)(l984); see also 1 REVISED 
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 653 (3d ed. 1985); Murphy, supra note 125, at 91. The 
wording of the MBCA suggests that a quorum must be present at all times in order for 
shareholders to act. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-61 (1972)(if quorum is present, affirma­
tive vote of majority of represented shares is act of all shareholders in absence of other 
statutory requirements).  
19• See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § §  79-3-119, -145, -157, - 167, ( 1972)(dealing with 
rights of holders of outstanding shares, rights of stockholders to dissent, and voluntary 
dissolution by shareholders). 
190 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 1.40(26)(1984). 
ui See supra note 262. 
HI REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 1.40(26)(1984). 
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rights must be specifically conferred by the articles unless provi­
sion therefor is otherwise made by the RMA itself. 
2. Inspection Rights. 
At common law, shareholders were granted the right to in­
spect the books and records of the corporation at proper times 
and places and for a proper purpose. In practice, however, that 
right was often an empty one, since the burden of  establishing 
the propriety of his purpose was, at least in earlier cases, im­
posed upon the shareholder.29s As a practical matter the right 
could be enforced only by a mandamus action, the delay and 
expense of which in many cases simply foreclosed the issue. As a 
result, Mississippi, like most states, passed remedial legislation 
to make the right of inspection a more realistic one.  294 Under 
traditional statutes such as the MBCA, however, a number of 
problems remain. 
The MBCA grants the statutory right of inspection only to 
shareholders who either have held their shares for at least six 
months or who own at least one percent of all outstanding 
shares. This does not prohibit those who cannot meet the requi­
site standard from obtaining inspection since the common law 
right is specifically preserved. The advantage of the statutory 
right, of course, is that while the shareholder must state his pur­
pose in writing, the burden of proving that it is improper is on 
the corporation. The relevance of the size or length of time of a 
shareholder's ownership to the propriety of his purpose is, how­
ever, far from clear. Thus it is doubtful whether this limitation 
serves any rational policy.2H 
Moreover, the sanction for wrongful refusal to allow inspec­
tion is a penalty of ten percent of the value of the shares owned 
by the sharehold�r, assessed against the corporation o r  its offic�r 
or agent responsible for the refusal. In practice, however, the in 
terrorem effect of this has been questionable. The value of the 
shareholder's stock may be minimal and thus the penalty may 
'" See 5 Y"· FL�CHER, supra note 53, § 2214; HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 53, § 199, at 537 (dtscussmg common law right of shareholders to inspect records). '". See Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972)(any shareholder holding for six months precedmg demand or holding at least 1 3 of all outstanding shares has right to ex8llline books and records for proper purpose) . 
... See 4 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. 1725 (3d ed. 1985). 
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be negligible. Moreover, even if the penalty would be substan­
tial, courts have shown but little inclination to assess it.2116 In­
deed, the enforceability of similar statutes has sometimes been 
questioned on the basis that the penalty had no relation to ac­
tual damages. 297 
In other respects, the MBCA is simply undesirably vague. 
For example, while the shareholder is accorded the right to ex­
amine certain books and records "and to make extracts there­
from, "298 the meaning of this is ambiguous-does it, for exam­
ple, give the shareholder (or his agent and attorney) only the 
right to copy by hand, or must the opportunity to photocopy be 
provided? Obviously the right to inspect could be substantially 
frustrated if the statute is read literally, as representatives of a 
corporation may be inclined to do. 
Chapter 16 of the RMA, dealing with records and reports, 
makes substantial improvements to the traditional approach of 
the MBCA. Section 16.01 mandates that a corporation maintain 
generally the same records as does the MBCA: actions of the 
directors and shareholders, accounting records, and a record of 
shareholders. 299 Additionally, it requires that the corporation 
keep at its principal office a number of essentially public records 
(e.g. , its articles, bylaws and annual report) as to which share­
holders are given an absolute right to inspect. soo 
The heart of the RMA inspection provisions is section 16.02, 
m For a collection of the few reported cases on the issue see id. at 1765-67. 
m See, e.g., Schaefer v. H.B. Green Transp. Line, Inc., 232 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1956), 
holding such a statute unenforceable. Id. at 417. The basis for the decision was that the 
plaintiff, an Illinois resident of an Iowa corporation doing business in both states, could 
not extend extraterritorially the penalty provision of Illinois law where Iowa law made 
no such provision. Id. 
H8 Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972). 
H• REVISED MoDEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 16.0l(a)-(c)(1984). In some instances, the 
RMA description is somewhat more exact. In addition to "minutes of the proceedings of 
shareholders and directors" as required by the MBCA, the RMA includes all actions 
taken by consent or without a meeting (as by conference telephone call) and all actions 
taken by committees. Id. § 16.0l(a). In addition, the RMA specifies that the sharehold­
ers' list must be in alphabetical order, a logical requirement omitted by the MBCA. Id. § 
16.0l(b). Finally, one difference in nomenclature exists: the RMA requires "appropriate 
accounting records," while the MBCA dictates "correct and complete books and records 
of account." Id. 
•oo REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 16.0l(e), 16.02(a)(l984). 
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which seeks to strike a balance between the interests of share­
holders and corporations. Section 16.02 eliminates any distinc­
tion based on time or size of stockholdings, and the statutory 
right is extended to all shareholders. On the other hand, in order 
to inspect records of the actions of directors and shareholders, 
acounting records, and the record of shareholders, a shareholder 
must meet a somewhat more detailed standard. He must make 
his demand in good faith and for a proper purpose, must de­
scribe with reasonable particularity his purpose and the desired 
records, and those records must be directly connected to his 
stated purposes. 301 The avowed goal is to force the shareholder 
to make a more "meaningful" statement of the reasons he seeks 
inspection. 302 
In addition to this specific right of inspection, section 16.02 
also recognizes the shareholders' separate rights to inspect the 
record of shareholders in connection with the annual meeting,303 
and to obtain information pursuant to discovery in litigation 
with the corporation. 304 As with the MBCA, the common law 
right of inspection is specifically preserved. 30� 
The RMA also prohibits a corporation from limiting the 
statutory right of inspection by its articles or bylaws. 306 While 
the public policy implicit in the MBCA provision would seem to 
prev�n� this, some state statutes have permitted "reasonable" 
restrictions and an explicit denial of this power is desirable. 
. !he R�A a�so substantially alters the procedure for enforc­
ing inspection rights. The financial penalty for unjustified re­
fusal to permit inspection is eliminated. Instead, section 16.04 
"01 Id. § 16.�2(b), (c). The MBCA requires only that the shareholder make a "writ­
ten demand stating the purpose thereof ... 
The RM� does not purport to define "proper purpose " although the official com-
ment to section 16.02 states th t ·t " 
' h d -
. , . 
a 1 means a purpose reasonably relevant to t e � 
mandmg shareholder.s mterest as a shareholder." Id. 
§ 
16.02 official comment. This, in 
�::� begs the questio� of what "interest" means. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pillsbury v. 
�e
h
l�, Inc., 291 Mmn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406, 411  (197l)("interest" contemplates con-cern wit mvestment return) F ll . 
B C 
· or a co ection of cases on this issue see 3 REVISED MooEL USINESS ORP. ACT. ANN 1737-46 (3d ed. 1985). IOI REVISED M B 101 See id. §§ ��� 16




•0• Id. § 16.02(e)(2). 
,.,. Id. § 16.02(d). 
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authorizes a shareholder to institute a judicial proceeding to 
compel inspection of the records covered by either 16.02(a) or 
(b).307 If inspection is ordered and the corporation cannot carry 
its burden of proving that it refused inspection due to a good 
faith, reasonable doubt that the shareholder had the right to in­
spect the requested records, the shareholder is entitled to pay­
ment of his costs including reasonable attorney's fees. 308 In order 
to prevent abuses by a shareholder, however, the court ordering 
inpection can place reasonable restrictions on use or dissemina­
tion of the information he obtains.309 
The RMA also clarifies the scope of the inpection right, pro­
viding that the right to "inspect and copy" under section 16.02 
includes, where reasonable, the right to receive photographic or 
similar copies, for which the corporation can assess a reasonable 
charge not exceeding the estimated cost of production or 
reproduction. 310 
The RMA provisions on inspection, then, eliminate certain 
restrictions imposed without rational basis by the MBCA as well 
as many of the ambiguities of our present law. Thus, I would 
recommend the adoption of sections 16.01 through 16.04 of the 
RMA without change. 
3. Dissemination of Financial Information. 
Historically state corporation statutes have done little af­
firmatively to mandate the disclosure of any information to 
shareholders. This has been true even though those same stat­
utes sanction the device of proxy voting, by which a shareholder 
can empower another person (often a member of management) 
to vote his shares for him. The result has been a system 
whereby, absent the elaborate disclosure rules applicable to 
companies registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
807 Id. § 16.04(a)(b). 
•0• Id. § 16.04(c). In contrast, the MBCA lists a number of specific acts of share­
holder misconduct which provide a defense to a shareholder's claim to a penalty. See 
Miss. CooE ANN. § 79-3-99 (1972)(corporation has defense if shareholder improperly used 
information from prior examination, did not act in good faith, or has offered share­
holder's list for sale). 
808 REVlSED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 16.04(d)(1984). 
no Id. § 1 6.03(b), (c). 
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1934,311 management can solicit proxies for its re-election with­
out providing a shareholder with any information whatsoever 
concerning the condition of his company.312 
Like most states, Mississippi only requires a corporation to 
provide a shareholder with financial information upon his �rit­
ten request. 313  The RMA adopts a considerably more detailed 
and burdensome requirement. Under section 16.20, every corpo­
ration is required annually to furnish each shareholder its an­
nual financial statements, including a balance sheet as of the 
end of the fiscal year, an income statement for that year, and a 
statement of changes in shareholders' equity for that year.31• 
The corporation must mail the statements within 120 days of 
the end of the year to existing shareholders and thereafter dur­
ing the ensuing year to any new shareholder who makes a writ­
ten request.316 Under the RMA, this obligation is mandatory and 
cannot be altered by the articles or bylaws. 
While the intent of the RMA is laudable, I believe that it 
places an unnecessary burden on many closely-held corpora­
tions, the shareholders of which may be generally familiar with 
the corporation's condition due to their active participation in 
its affairs. On the other hand, I do not believe that simply leav­
ing mandatory disclosure to the arena of the federal securities 
laws is the appropriate answer since many corporations which 
should legitimately be considered as publicly-held would not 
"' Under § 12(g) ( l )  of the Act, every issuer with total assets exceeding $1,000,000 
and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more persons must register that 
security. 15 U .S.C . § 78l(g)(l982). By rule the asset threshold was increased to $3,000,000 
in 1982, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 2  g-1 ( 1986), and to $5,000,000 in 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,360 
(1986). 
'" See, e.g. , Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-63 (1972)(no mention of necessity of disclosure 
�h�n soliciting proxies); FREY. CHOPPER, LEACH & MORRIS, supra note 53, at 428-29 (out· 
hmng pr�xy solicitation procedure). Indeed the inadequacy of state law in this area was a 
primary impetus to the promulgation of the proxy regulations of the SEC. 
"' Under Section 99 of the MBCA, a shareholder is entitled to receive the corpora· 
�i?n's "most recent financial statements showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabil· 
•ties a�d the .
re�ults of its operations." Miss. CoDE ANN. § 79.3.99 (1972). The over· 
whelming ma1onty of ststes follow this pattern. 4 REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. Ac:r 
ANN. 1773-74 (3d ed. 1985). 
"' REVISED MonEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 16.20(a)(l984). The statements are not 
abeolutely required to be prepared on the basis of generally accepted accounting princi· 
pies IGAAP),  but must be if those prepared for the corporation itself are. Id. 1 1 1  Id. § 16.20(c). 
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meet the filing requirements of the 1934 Act.316 Thus, I would 
recommend the adoption of section 16.20, with a de minimis ex­
ception allowing corporations with fewer than a specified num­
ber of shareholders (perhaps fifty) to waive the mandatory re­
quirement in their bylaws, while retaining the requirement that 
the same information be provided to any shareholder upon writ­
ten request.317 This would eliminate what might be an unneces­
sary formality in the truly closely-held business, while encourag­
ing frank disclosure from the management of the larger company 
to its shareholders. 318 
Ill CONCLUSION-PART ONE 
The first part of this article has attempted to expose a vari­
ety of areas of the MBCA which are in need of improvement or 
modification. The second part will undertake a similar goal in 
the areas of capitalization, organic changes, shareholder litiga­
tion, and the problems of the closely-held business. 
m See supra note 311. 
111 Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a)(West Supp. 1986)(permitting corporations with 
fewer than 100 shareholders to waive mandatory requirement). 
au To be sure, one objection to mandatory disclosure is that management may bear 
liability for inaccurate information, even to a shareholder who may have no interest in 
that information in the first instance. See Murphy, supra note 125, at 135 (discussing 
alternatives for complete mandatory disclosure). While the possibility of second-guessing 
is inherent in any disclosure requirement, the RMA, unlike the federal proxy rules, has 
no express provision dealing with false and misleading statements. In any event, a de 
minimis exception is likely to allay many of these concerns, since most larger companies 
would be likely to employ an outside accountant, and no certification by management 
would be required in that instance. See REVISED MODEL Bus1NESS CoRP. Acr § 16.20(b) 
(1984). In the smaller corporation, it seems unlikely that a court would impose substan­
tial liability for good faith errors by a corporate official who is not a trained professional 
accountant. See id. official comment (noting different standards which should be applied 
to professionals and non-professionals under this provision). 
